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I. INTRODUCTION 
The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously.  Any 
sound that [a person] made, above the level of a very low whisper, 
would be picked up by it. . . . There was of course no way of 
knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.  
How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on 
any individual was guesswork.  It was even conceivable that they 
watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to live—did live, from 
habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound 
you made was overheard, and . . . every movement scrutinized.1
 
Nineteen eighty-four came and went without realizing the bleak 
existence imagined in George Orwell’s novel, set in a world where the 
terms “privacy” and “freedom” were, literally, scheduled to be erased 
from the common vernacular.2  However, a survey of modern 
technology and its uses just twenty years later raises the question: was 
Orwell altogether wrong, or just overzealous in his estimates of how 
long it would take to erode completely our understanding of 
 1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1949). 
 2 Id. at 53 (describing the work of those compiling the “Eleventh Edition of the 
Newspeak dictionary” and the ultimate goal: to make “[e]very year fewer and fewer 
words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller” until “[e]very concept 
that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word”); see also id. at 54 
(speaking optimistically of a time “when the concept of freedom has been 
abolished”). 
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personal space and privacy?  In the context of employment, an 
Orwellian reality is not as fanciful as once thought, for new 
developments in employee surveillance programs threaten to bring 
us closer to the world Orwell envisioned.3  With the advent of Global 
Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking services, employers can now 
purchase technology that allows them to watch everybody all the time 
and scrutinize every movement. 
Other commentators have already expressed concern about 
various types of employee surveillance.  The alarm bells went off 
when video surveillance and Internet tracking software debuted in 
workplaces.4  Still, these practices, limited somewhat by a need to 
show business-relatedness, have largely found acceptance in some 
form.5  GPS monitoring programs, however, raise unique issues that 
arguably go beyond acceptable boundaries for employee surveillance.  
Because GPS tracking systems can, have, and likely will continue to 
capture off-duty movements of employees,6 this form of surveillance 
is more nefarious than the types of employee monitoring programs 
debated elsewhere. 
Moreover, in contrast to the at-work monitoring of, for example, 
e-mail and Internet use, the after-hours stalking of employees bears 
no relationship to productivity, trade secret theft, or harassment 
prevention efforts—a few of the reasons employers have proffered to 
justify monitoring activities in other contexts.7  GPS is a prime 
example of “technology [that enables] employers to gather enormous 
amounts of data about employees, often far beyond what is necessary to 
satisfy safety or productivity concerns.”8  Even more disconcerting, “the 
 3 See Eric Wieffering, Blurring of Home, Online and Work May Redraw Privacy Limits, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Feb. 13, 2000, at A1 (“‘We used to worry that Big Brother 
would be the government,’ said Craig Cornish, a Colorado attorney who specializes 
in worker privacy rights.  ‘But Big Brother is increasingly the employer.’”). 
 4 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles 
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289 (2002) (electronic 
monitoring of Internet use); Stephen B. Stern & Pamela J. White, Legal Risks of 
Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, MD. B. ASS’N, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 3 (video 
surveillance). 
 5 Kristen Bell DeTienne & Richard D. Flint, The Boss’s Eyes and Ears: A Case Study 
of Electronic Employee Monitoring and the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, 12 LAB. 
LAW. 93, 93 (1996) (“Traditionally, employers in America have been allowed to 
eavesdrop, videotape, tap phone lines, and search through computer files, without 
employee knowledge or consent.  In fact, some federal laws that prohibit wire 
tapping and other forms of spying specifically exempt employers . . . .”). 
 6 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 7 Tonianne Florentino, Privacy in the Workplace, 788 PLI/PAT. 551, 563 (2004). 
 8 FREDERICK S. LANE III, THE NAKED EMPLOYEE: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS 
COMPROMISING WORKPLACE PRIVACY 3–4 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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trends that drive technology—faster, smaller, cheaper—[will] make it 
possible for larger and larger numbers of employers to gather ever-
greater amounts of personal data”9 by saddling their employees with 
GPS tracking devices. 
Location determination technologies have proliferated rapidly 
in the workplace not only because of technology’s seemingly 
instinctive ability to develop faster than the laws that might control 
it,10 but also because federal regulations have lowered the cost of 
utilizing these services.  The Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) imposed a December 31, 2002 deadline on mobile phone 
service providers to update their product lines to include only phones 
capable of pinpointing a user’s location.11  This translated to a 
requirement that new phones function as GPS receivers.  
Additionally, the regulations tasked service providers with the chore 
of ensuring that ninety-five percent of their customers possess 
“location-capable” phones by December 31, 2005—a deadline that is 
rapidly approaching.12  Through this regulation, the FCC hopes to 
provide faster and more accurate emergency service to those who 
make 9-1-1 calls from cell phones.13  But with nearly every cell phone 
owner toting a GPS tracking device in their pocket or purse, this 
development also has unintentional benefits for the emerging 
personnel and fleet management industry.14  Soon, companies will be 
able to stalk the large number of people in their workforce who carry 
cell phones. 
Without reasonable statutory restrictions on employee tracking 
techniques, workers will need to rely on existing laws and doctrines, 
which this Article will expose as wholly inadequate to handle this 
emerging problem.15  Defenseless, employees thus face the danger 
 9 Id.; see also Otis B. Grant, Law and Perceptions: Internal Investigations and Employee 
Privacy Interests in Public Sector Employment, 71 UMKC L. REV. 1, 24 (2002) (warning 
that “[w]ith the advent of new technology, employee monitoring will steadily 
increase as it becomes cheaper to perform”). 
 10 William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 91, 103 (2003) (characterizing “electronic monitoring [as] an area 
where technology has outstripped the law, leaving employees largely unprotected”). 
 11 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g)(1)(iv) (2004). 
 12 Id. § 20.18(g)(1)(v). 
 13 Id. § 20.18 (establishing the E-911 program); see also Laurie Thomas Lee, Can 
Police Track Your Wireless Calls?  Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 381 (2003). 
 14 One author described the E-911 program as “[p]erhaps the single most 
important thrust area for locator services.”  John A. Lever, Unintended Consequences of 
the Global Positioning System, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, May 6, 2004, at 217, available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/108563806/ABSTRACT. 
 15 See discussion infra Part III. 
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that electronic devices will erode their personal privacy,16 a fear first 
articulated by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their 
seminal work, The Right to Privacy.17  Once again, “[t]he intensity and 
complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world . . . .”18  Without 
some form of legal protection for off-duty employees, however, 
employers will have an unchecked ability to follow them into that 
retreat,19 making note of every place an employee stops along the 
way. 
On the other side of the debate, GPS monitoring certainly offers 
attractive benefits for employers.  These devices enable companies to 
provide faster service and increase productivity through better 
coordination of employees who work remotely—particularly 
advantageous features for employers of delivery and maintenance 
workers.20  They also function as risk management tools by facilitating 
faster recovery of stolen property and encouraging respect for traffic 
rules.21  But when the workday ends, many of the justifications for 
monitoring become irrelevant.22
Additionally, these interests should be weighed against the 
negative impact that employee surveillance tends to have on its 
subjects.  Monitoring “takes its toll on workers and companies in 
terms of stress, fatigue, apprehension, motivation, morale, and trust; 
this results in increased absenteeism, turnover, poorer management, 
 16 Peter J. Isajiw, Comment, Workplace Email Privacy Concerns: Balancing the Personal 
Dignity of Employees with the Proprietary Interests of Employers, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &  
TECH. J. 73, 74 (2001). 
 17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
 18 Id. at 196 (discussing how the press was, at the time “overstepping in every 
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency”). 
 19 The technology “rarely works anywhere but outdoors.”  David A. Schumann, 
Tracking Evidence with GPS Technology, WIS. LAW., May 2004, at 62 n.13.  But given how 
far the technology has come, this obstacle will likely be overcome in the near future.  
Some reports claim that companies, including Sprint, already have technology that 
“can pinpoint a phone’s location within . . . 1,000 feet if it is inside.”  David Hayes, 
Locator Phones: Spies or Helpers?, KAN. CITY STAR, May 16, 2005, at A1. 
 20 See DeTienne & Flint, supra note 5, at 95–96; see also infra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
 21 See discussion infra notes 60–61, 65 and accompanying text. 
 22 Granted, regardless of whether an employee is off-duty, other employer 
interests may be furthered by after-hours monitoring when company vehicles, 
vulnerable to theft or misuse, are involved.  However, these concerns are not relevant 
for every employer using GPS tracking devices and exceptions, like the one described 
in the statutory proposal in Part V.C.3 of this Article, can protect legitimate after-
hours interests in valuable employer-owned property. 
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and lower productivity, not to mention higher health-care costs.”23  By 
failing to legislate in this area and allowing employers to exercise an 
absolute power to stalk employees around the clock, government 
implicitly favors the employers’ interests over those of employees, 
who have an equally substantial stake in how the law approaches this 
issue.  For example: 
[E]mployment is a key source of self-esteem for many workers.  
Individuals often define themselves by their occupations, which 
becomes a significant aspect of their personae.  Because of the 
substantial interests individuals have in both employment and in 
privacy, invasive monitoring puts employees in a “catch-22” 
situation, forcing them to sacrifice reasonable expectations of 
privacy because of their need to work.24
The law should not enable employers to put employees in this 
impossible position. 
After-hours GPS monitoring takes two controversial issues in 
employment law—electronic monitoring and discipline for off-duty 
activity—and combines them, creating the potential for a “worst of 
both worlds” situation.  Legislators and courts have found reasonable 
exceptions that separately allow for electronic monitoring in the 
workplace and off-duty observations in some contexts,25 but off-duty 
GPS tracking of employees goes beyond these tolerable limits. 
Motivated by these concerns, this Article will attempt to build a 
case for why and how off-duty GPS tracking of employees should be 
limited by federal statute.  Part II provides historical information 
regarding the development of GPS technology, how it became a part 
of civilian business operations, and its impact on workers thus far.  
Part III explores the potential legal theories that might provide a 
means for balancing employer interests in using technology that 
enhances efficiency and employee interests in maintaining some 
shred of privacy in a world where personal lives are increasingly less 
 23 Kesan, supra note 4, at 320; see also 139 CONG. REC. S6122, 6123 (1993) 
(statement of Sen. Paul Simon in support of S. 984) (recalling the testimony of a 
Northwest Airlines sales representative who was electronically monitored so 
pervasively “that she had to get a doctor’s note to limit the amount of monitoring she 
[was] to be subjected to during a work day due to the stress and health problems the 
monitoring had caused”).  Given these effects, one would think that employers 
would recognize on their own how short-sighted the ruthless operation of an 
electronic sweatshop really is; but even economic losses resulting from employee 
stress have not dampened employers’ interest in gathering more information about 
their employees. 
 24 S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring 
in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 835 (1998). 
 25 See discussion infra Part III.B.2 and infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
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distinguishable from work lives.26  This section concludes, however, 
that existing legal doctrines are imperfect vehicles for the pursuit of 
an employee’s right not to be monitored after hours.  Part IV 
explores how the law has responded to the use of GPS devices to 
monitor people in other contexts and observes that, in an 
unregulated world, the rights of employees most closely resemble 
those of suspected and convicted criminals, when they should instead 
correspond with the rights against surreptitious monitoring that state 
legislators have recently created for consumers.  Part V thus seeks to 
develop an acceptable proposal for a federal law governing after-
hours monitoring of employees.  This section explores recent failed 
efforts to create generic employee privacy laws and attempts to 
remedy the shortcomings of these bills by proposing a more narrow 
solution targeted at one of the more egregious forms of employee 
privacy violations: the constant surveillance of the off-duty activities of 
employees. 
II. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND 
 
As with other technological developments, GPS tracking systems 
threaten to outpace lawmakers’ abilities to ensure that old rights are 
not sacrificed in exchange for the “convenience” offered by modern 
machinery.27  Blinded by the glowing screen of each new gadget, 
society generally tends to moon over efficiency gains without 
considering the true cost of living in a more automated society.  The 
story behind the evolution of GPS monitoring technology reveals 
another invention falling into this pattern, in which the modern 
marvel becomes, under some circumstances, the modern menace. 
 26 Wieffering, supra note 3. 
 27 See LANE, supra note 8, at 185 (discussing the “persistent tension between 
‘privacy’—our innate desire to control the information that is known about us—and 
‘convenience’—our equally innate desire for day-to-day life to be a little easier”).  
Lane offers Internet technologies, capable of remembering preferences and 
payment information, as one example of the trade-off between privacy and 
convenience.  Id.  The same technology that relieves us of having to retype personal 
information for every Internet transaction also “help[s] websites track which pages 
we look at and the sites we visit afterwards.”  Id.  Going back even further, Lane 
reminds us that we also traded huge amounts of information about our shopping, 
eating, and travel habits to credit card companies in exchange for the convenience 
of not having to carry cash.  Id.  “The trading of privacy for convenience has become 
so commonplace that we often don’t even think about it.”  Id. 
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A. GPS Technology and How It Works 
From the beginning, the Global Positioning System was designed 
to track an increasingly mobile population, although not the civilian 
masses who are now the targets of its unblinking gaze.28  The military 
developed the technology after the Vietnam War “to form a 
worldwide navigational system”29 that could track troops on the 
ground in remote locations.30  The resulting GPS infrastructure 
consisted of twenty-four primary satellites, arranged in six orbital 
planes, and a handful of spares31 that now circle the earth every 
twelve hours from a distance of about 10,900 nautical miles.32  At any 
given time, five satellites are visible from a given point on earth, 
although determining a receiver’s location requires using only three 
to four satellites.33  By measuring the length of radio signals emitted 
by these satellites, a receiver on earth can calculate its own location, 
within ten to 100 meters, by “triangulating” the signals.34  
Additionally, “[i]f a person is mobile, a GPS receiver may calculate 
the person’s speed and direction of travel . . . .”35
 28 One author has described GPS as “an asset of the U.S. Government that has 
seen widespread adoption in the last decade, far beyond its original intended 
purpose.”  Lever, supra note 14, at 220. 
 29 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: FORMS & ANALYSIS § 1.03 
(2003). 
 30 Richard C. Balough, Global Positioning System and the Internet: A Combination with 
Privacy Risks, 15 CBA REC. 28, 29 (Oct. 2001). 
 31 The number of spares appears to fluctuate.  At the start of 2003, with only two 
back-ups in place, the United States launched its first new addition since 2001.  Justin 
Ray, Delta Rocket Launches GPS Navigation Satellite, SPACEFLIGHT NOW, Jan. 29, 2003, 
http://spaceflightnow.com/delta/d295 [hereinafter Ray, Delta Rocket Launches].  
Subsequently, hurricanes and other weather-related obstacles interfered with 
launches in 2004.  Worldwide Launch Schedule, SPACEFLIGHT NOW, http://spaceflight 
now.com/tracking (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).  At last count, the military had a total 
of twenty-eight craft (twenty-four functioning satellites and four back-ups), in place 
for navigation purposes.  Justin Ray, Delta Rocket Successfully Launches One for The 
Gipper, SPACEFLIGHT NOW, June 23, 2004, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/delta/ 
d305. 
 32 Balough, supra note 30, at 29; Ray, Delta Rocket Launches, supra note 31. 
 33 SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING NATIONAL 
POLICIES app. A, at 218 (1995), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/ 
MR614/MR614.appa.pdf. 
 34 Balough, supra note 30, at 29; see also David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: 
Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 
(2003) (explaining that “[t]riangulation calculates the user’s location by comparing 
the same signal as it arrives at several receiving towers”).  Depending on the number 
of satellites involved in the calculation, a GPS receiver may be able to determine its 
altitude in addition to its geographic position.  RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 
29. 
 35 RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 29. 
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In 1983, after the Russians shot down a disoriented Korean 
Airlines flight that mistakenly entered Russian airspace, President 
Ronald Reagan approved the commercial use of the military’s GPS 
infrastructure.36  At first, civilian use of the technology developed 
slowly in niche markets such as surveying and aviation.37  Then, just as 
the 24-satellite constellation in place today neared completion, “[t]he 
success of GPS in Operation Desert Storm sparked a surge in a 
growing multi-million-dollar market that had barely existed just a few 
years prior to the war.”38  News coverage of “soldiers navigat[ing] 
across a featureless desert” and “bomber units target[ing] the enemy 
with unprecedented accuracy” essentially provided free advertising 
for GPS service providers.39
The industry grew rapidly after these events and continues to 
expand.  “[S]ome analysts now predict that the burgeoning industry 
may see annual revenues as high as $34 to $41 billion by 2006.”40  
Additionally, the product line continues to diversify and currently 
includes services ranging from OnStar’s Neverlost system, an onboard 
navigation tool that guides drivers to a user-specified destination, to 
Wherify and Digital Angel’s personal tracking wristwatches, ideal 
devices to use when pursuing a kidnapped toddler or rebellious 
teenager.41  Despite the ever-expanding array of available services, 
 36 Waseem Karim, Note, The Privacy Implications of Personal Locators: Why You 
Should Think Twice Before Voluntarily Availing Yourself to GPS Monitoring, 14 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485 & n.3 (2004) (citing ALESSANDRA A.L. ANDRADE, THE GLOBAL 
NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM: NAVIGATING INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 37, 38, 53 n.6 
(2001)). 
 37 PACE ET AL., supra note 33, app. B, at 248–49. 
 38 Id. at 250.  Shortages of military receivers further stimulated sales of civilian 
GPS products as the military had to purchase thousands of privately manufactured 
devices for its operations in Iraq.  To use these devices, the military also had to make 
the system more accessible to civilian products, which enhanced the accuracy of 
commercial GPS receivers.  Id. at 250–51. 
 39 Id. 
 40 LANE, supra note 8, at 200; see also James C. White, People, Not Places: A Policy 
Framework for Analyzing Location Privacy Issues 13 (Spring 2003) (unpublished 
M.A. memorandum, Duke University), http://www.epic.org/privacy/location/jwhite 
locationprivacy.pdf (“[B]y 2006, the worldwide market for location-based services is 
expected to be almost $40 Billion.”).  Contra Employee Tracking Technology Raises 
Concerns About Privacy, 174 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 347 (May 10, 2004) (offering a 
more conservative estimate, predicting that “[l]ocation-based services—which can be 
used to monitor employee movement—will be a $15 billion industry by 2007 as a 
variety of interested companies scramble to implement it in various elements of their 
business operations” (quoting Cindy-Ann L. Thomas, Taft HR Solutions)). 
 41 Karim, supra note 36, at 488–92 (describing personal tracking devices).  The 
industry’s plans are not, however, limited to stand-alone tracking devices.  Firms like 
Applied Digital Solutions, the maker of VeriChip, have designed more invasive 
devices that are “surgically imbedded underneath a person’s skin,” id. at 490–92, 
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however, this Article focuses exclusively on one segment of the 
market: the fleet and personnel management tools that, 
unbeknownst to many employees, are already in place, monitoring a 
worker’s every move.  The next section describes these tools and 
services and the companies that deploy them. 
B. Packages Offered for Employee Monitoring and the Companies That 
Use Them 
As previously noted, employers do have compelling reasons for 
using GPS tracking systems to monitor a mobile workforce.42  Many 
fleet management programs tout their ability to prevent theft of 
company assets, verify employee productivity, and reduce insurance 
premiums by providing carriers with evidence that drivers comply 
with traffic laws.  These companies offer a variety of tracking options, 
ranging from “active” systems that report location data at regular 
intervals, to “passive” devices that log downloadable tracking 
information.  Thus, when choosing a system, employers must weigh 
their interests in having such services and business needs against cost 
and system complexity.43  The following provides a sampling of the 
specific services these tracking companies offer. 
One example of a workforce monitoring program is Aligo’s 
WorkTrack, an active, real-time system that allows employers to 
monitor time and location information via the Internet.44  Like many 
systems, Aligo promotes itself as “an easy, accurate way to manage the 
time of your mobile employees, raising productivity and bringing 
causing some to speculate “that it is only a matter of time until people are routinely 
‘scanned like a box of Wheaties.’”  Marren Sanders, Chipping: Could a High Tech Dog 
Tag Find Future American MIAs?, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 209, 211 (2002) (citation omitted).  
Indeed, the FDA’s recent approval of VeriChip implants moved the United States 
one step closer to this reality.  FDA OKS Implanted Medical Info Chip, CNN, Oct. 13, 
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/10/13/fda.implant.chip.ap/index. 
html.  But cf. Barnaby J. Feder & Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Chip Planted Under Skin 
Approved for Use in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at A1 (reporting that 
although Applied Digital Solutions hopes that the VeriChip’s approved medical use 
will “accelerate the acceptance of under-the-skin ID chips as security and access-
control devices,” the chips do not currently have “the ability to track individuals via 
satellite”). 
 42 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 43 ERETAILNEWS, ERETAILREPORT: GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS FOR RETAIL FLEET 
MANAGEMENT 6 (2001), http://www.eretailnews.com/issues/2001-7.PDF.  Hybrid 
active/passive systems are also available, as well as systems that use another set of 
satellites for two-way communication.  Id. at 3. 
 44 Aligo – The Mobile Enterprise Software Company, WorkTrack, http://www. 
aligo.com/products/workTrack (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
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substantial cost savings to your business.”45  However, unlike other 
products that merely track movements of an employer’s equipment, 
such as a company car, Aligo monitors employees using “the GPS-
enabled phones they already carry . . . .”46
This technology is troublesome for two reasons.  First, cell 
phone tracking systems, based on hand held devices, allow employers 
to monitor not only their equipment, but, more specifically, the 
people who carry it.  Although Aligo has an “on break” mode, the 
marketing materials suggest that this feature exists for the employer’s 
benefit, not the employee’s.  This function allows the employer to 
record time more accurately—the materials say nothing about 
whether the employee can use this feature to prevent his employer 
from hunting him down when he is “on break,” or even off the job 
entirely, if the device is turned off.47  Devices that continue to relay 
location information after an employee clocks out give employers 
control, or at least influence, over an employee’s uncompensated 
time and invite overbearing invasions of privacy.  Second, assuming 
that the device can be tracked after-hours and while off, an employer 
might discipline an employee for someone else’s extracurricular 
activity.  No feature offers confirmation that the device remained in 
the employee’s possession at all times. 
The system offered by Comet Tracker is only slightly less 
invasive.  As a phone-based system, it has the potential, like Aligo’s 
WorkTrack, to mistakenly attribute the location of a misplaced phone 
to the employee responsible for it.  The system does, however, have 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id.  Given that the devices can be used to “[a]lert[] the central office of status 
and availability to take new jobs” and “[d]isplay[] a current map with the location of 
your entire workforce,” the technology appears to track workers both on and off the 
job.  Id.  Even more disconcerting for the employees, Aligo promises “continuous 
access, regardless of connectivity.”  Id.  This statement seems to give more credence 
to the assumption that the products can function as homing devices even when 
turned off.  See also NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., ON YOUR TRACKS: GPS TRACKING IN THE 
WORKPLACE 11 (2004), http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/NWI_GPS_ 
Report.pdf (“[I]n some cases, even when the devices appear to be turned off, they 
still emit detectable signals.”); Stacy A. Teicher, It’s 2 a.m. Do You Know Where Your 
Workers Are?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2003, available at http://www. 
csmonitor.com/2003/1222/p14s02-wmgn.html (speaking generally of GPS tracking 
devices embedded in cell phones and noting that “[i]n some cases, even when the 
devices appear to be turned off, they still emit signals that can be detected”).  
Perhaps most frightening, however, is Aligo’s promise to enable employers to 
“[a]lways know where [their] employees are.”  Aligo – The Mobile Enterprise Software 
Company, WorkTrack, http://www.aligo.com/products/workTrack (emphasis 
added) (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). 
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an automatic shut off feature that prevents after-hours tracking.48  In 
exchange for this “protection” though,49 employees monitored using 
Comet Tracker must operate within a “geofence”—a predefined area 
that, when breached, will trigger an alert.50  Again, this technology 
puts the worker who takes an innocent detour to avoid traffic or road 
construction at an incredible disadvantage as he or she might be fired 
for venturing out of the employer’s virtual cage.51  Employers may be 
interested in “always know[ing] exactly where [their] workers are—
and where they’ve been,”52 but do they really need such far-reaching 
power over their employees—especially after-hours? 
Employees might feel slightly less threatened by FleetBoss Global 
Positioning Solutions’ fleet management services.  Using GPS 
tracking devices, FleetBoss monitors vehicles, not people, although 
this might be of little consequence to the employee who stops to run 
an errand on the way home in the company car and unintentionally 
reveals information about her personal life to her employer.  
FleetBoss might discourage employees from “going home, . . . to Wal-
Mart and [to] the grocery store on company time,”53 but what 
happens when an employer virtually observes the employee stopping 
during her lunch hour at Planned Parenthood and fires her based on 
 48 Comet Tracker Overview, available at http://www.comettracker.com/ 
overview.html (describing the features of Comet Tracker, the company’s brochure 
claims to offer employers the ability to “[a]lert workers to start tracking” and 
“[a]utomatically stop tracking at the end of the day” (emphasis added)).  Although 
the program appears to place all control over the timing and duration of monitoring 
in the hands of the employer, at least the system offers a technically feasible cloaking 
capability. 
 49 The Author remains skeptical that the physical ability to turn off the phone 
can offer employees much relief given that the employer is likely to assume the worst 
if an employee decides to shield her activities from observation.  See LANE, supra note 
8, at 207 (“If a constant stream of location data is the norm in your workplace, then 
information gaps are going to be suspicious.  Sometimes, the absence of data can be 
just as problematic as reams of it.”). 
 50 Comet Tracker, available at http://www.actsoft.com/products/tracker.html 
(describing communication features capable of “[a]utomati[cally] email[ing] an 
alert when workers . . . travel outside their set home areas”). 
 51 See Ben Charny, Big Boss Is Watching, C|NET NEWS.COM, Sept. 24, 2004, 
http://news.com.com/Big+boss+is+watching/2100-1036_3-5379953.html (describing 
Xora’s “‘geofences’ technology that sets off an alarm at the office when field workers 
go to preprogrammed off-limits sites, such as a bar or a park”); Charny, supra 
(“‘There’s no electro shock—yet,’ Xora CEO Sanjay Shirole said.”). 
 52 Comet Tracker, How Do You Track Your Workers? (2003), http://www. 
comettracker.com/nextel/docs/CometTrackerFlyer.pdf. 
 53 FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management – Business Needs 
Survey, http://www.fleetboss.com/needssurvey.asp (follow “Overtime Tip” 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (quoting ServiceMaster, Lakeland, FL, a 
satisfied FleetBoss customer). 
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assumptions about her position on family planning methods?54  Even 
programs that only monitor vehicles can threaten to restrict the 
activities of mobile employees while they are on breaks or off-duty 
and not being compensated by their employer.  In fact, after-hours 
control over workers in part motivated at least one FleetBoss 
customer, Mr. Rooter Plumbing, to subscribe to FleetBoss’ services.55
This discussion describes just a few of the many service providers 
clamoring for a piece of this emerging market.  Employers already 
using these services include Orkin Pest Control (FleetBoss), Sun 
Microsystems (WorkTrack), and Lucent Technologies 
(WorkTrack).56  Customers are often companies that, like those 
mentioned, have a deployable service-providing workforce.  The 
tracking services, however, might appeal to any employer that desires 
more control over the productivity of largely unsupervised 
employees.  Corporate lawyers, already equipped with the industry’s 
standard issue BlackBerry, might some day find themselves subject to 
similar tracking programs.57
C. The Business Case for Using GPS to Monitor Employees and 
Equipment 
Although the discussion in Part II.B described GPS monitoring 
systems as somewhat sinister and suspect, a fair discussion of these 
programs must recognize the legitimate business objectives achieved 
using monitoring services.  Generally, an employer’s interest in 
tracking its mobile workforce will stem from either an interest in 
 54 LANE, supra note 8, at 200 (“What if you stop at Planned Parenthood on your 
lunch break and your supervisor wants to know if you’re pregnant?”). 
 55 FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management Testimonials: Rob 
Birnie of Mr. Rooter Plumbing, http://www.fleetboss.com/testimonials.asp?REFERE 
NCE_ID=53 (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (describing one customer’s requirements: 
“Drivers take trucks home, so after hours monitoring was needed”). 
 56 FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management Testimonials, 
http://www.fleetboss.com/testimonials.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2005); Aligo Inc., 
Aligo Customers, http://www.aligo.com/customers/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).  
Comet Tracker does not provide a list of customers. 
 57 Research In Motion’s (“RIM”) BlackBerry is a wireless e-mail device, phone, 
and electronic organizer all rolled into one.  The company claims that over eighty 
percent of AmLaw 200 firms use its products to make the lives of mobile attorneys 
more manageable.  BlackBerry.com, BlackBerry for the Legal Community, http://www. 
blackberry.com/solutions/industry/legal/index.shtml?CPID=ILC-hllegal (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2005).  But the reverse may also be true—equipped with a GPS receiver in 
accordance with new FCC regulations, see supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text, 
the BlackBerry could be used to manage the attorneys themselves, not just their 
schedules.  The invasion of privacy may be staged by employers of every stripe—not 
just those who manage delivery services. 
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limiting employer liability or in maintaining effective business 
operations (or both).58  This section will explain each of these 
categories in turn. 
First, concern about liability for employee torts and work-related 
injuries can justify an employer’s interest in monitoring how 
employees perform away from the office.  “If employees were solely 
responsible for their own actions, the need for surveillance would be 
greatly reduced . . . . [But] the doctrine of respondeat superior—
which provides that an employer is liable for the negligence of an 
employee—has become an integral part of our legal system.”59  As the 
GPS service providers point out, the ability to monitor and discipline 
employees for speeding can significantly reduce employer liability for 
accidents and other traffic violations.60  Moreover, “[i]nsurers will 
likely reward employers that monitor employees with lower rates, 
because GPS information will help predict and control risk, and 
confirm legitimate claims for early payment,” thus providing 
employers with still more incentives to monitor speed.61  Finally, in 
the event that a worker is injured in the field, the ability to quickly 
pinpoint his location and provide medical assistance may reduce the 
extent of his injuries and resulting workers’ compensation costs.62  
Employers do not enjoy less responsibility for providing a safe 
 58 Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the 
Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 625, 628 (2004). 
 59 LANE, supra note 8, at 187.  Lane explains that “[t]he theory behind the 
doctrine is that employers have the ability to control the actions of their employees, 
through both training and company policy, and therefore are liable for the injuries 
that their employees cause within the scope of their duties.”  Id.  But Lane also notes, 
perhaps cynically, that “[t]he practical motivation is that the employer generally has 
greater resources (or can afford more insurance) and is therefore in a better 
position to compensate the injured party.”  Id. 
 60 See Xora, Industry Solutions Brief: Transportation & Distribution, http://www. 
xora.com/timetrack/documents/pdf/LQ/Industry_Solutions_Transportation.pdf 
(monitoring an employee’s speed “helps to ensure the safety of a company’s driver 
staff as well as other motorists, while protecting the customers’ shipments”). 
 61 Schumann, supra note 19, at 61; Xora, supra note 60 (promoting Xora’s GPS 
TimeTrack product by claiming that “if the drivers have better driving records, 
companies can keep insurance costs down”). 
 62 Kesan, supra note 4, at 318 (“Monitoring is key to some safety initiatives and 
better safety means lower insurance premiums and workers’ compensation pay-
outs.”).  Interestingly, despite the enhanced personal safety offered by GPS 
monitoring systems, even those employed in one of the most dangerous mobile 
professions—police officers—would rather risk being alone and injured if the 
alternative is invasive surveillance.  See Geoffrey James, Can’t Hide Your Prying Eyes, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 1, 2004, http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/ 
0,4814,90518,00.html (describing the Orlando Police Department’s failed attempt to 
pilot an officer surveillance program). 
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working environment simply because their employees are not in the 
workplace, and GPS surveillance offers one way to better manage this 
potential liability. 
Second, GPS systems can significantly improve the efficiency of 
an employer’s fleet management practices by helping to identify 
unproductive employees,63 eliminate wasteful service routes,64 and 
recover stolen property—especially vehicles.65  Services such as 
FleetBoss can significantly lower fuel costs by helping employers 
control vehicle idling and speeding, which uses fuel inefficiently.66  
More dynamic routing plans can further reduce fuel costs, in 
addition to providing better customer service, by allowing employers 
to deploy the nearest available service person with very little notice.67  
Employers are not just interested in monitoring employees for 
sport—GPS tracking of mobile employees offers substantial savings. 
D. How GPS Monitoring Has Impacted Employees 
On the other hand, the substantial benefits that GPS tracking 
systems offer come at a cost.  Scores of news stories document how 
GPS monitoring has disrupted the lives of numerous employees who 
live in fear of being dismissed for innocuous behavior that a 
monitoring system might distort into something more suspicious.68  
 63 Schumann, supra note 19, at 61 (“GPS information will disclose employee 
abuses, such as alcohol consumption while working, deviations from routes . . . , and 
general shirking, and result in greater productivity.”). 
 64 Christopher Sherman, Polk Keeping an Eye on the Wheels When Workers Drive the 
County, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 24, 2004, at H1 (explaining that technology can 
help employers “find[] the closest vehicle to a particular address” and provide better 
customer service). 
 65 Sue Darcy, Employers’ Use of GPS Units Stirs Employee Privacy Concerns, 175 Lab. 
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 212 (Aug. 30, 2004). 
 66 One customer in particular, Orkin Pest Control in Atlanta, Georgia, claimed 
that FleetBoss helped the business save $50,000 a month on fuel costs.  FleetBoss 
Global Positioning Solutions, Fleet Management Testimonials: Don King, http:// 
www.fleetboss.com/testimonials.asp?REFERENCE_ID=1; see also GPS Fleet Solutions, 
CHECKMate High Resolution System, http://www.gpsfleetsolutions.com/pdfs/ 
overviews/CHECKmate%20Presentation.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005) (noting that 
“[r]esearch indicate[s] that each mile per hour above 50 MPH increases fuel 
consumption by 1.5%”). 
 67 FleetBoss Global Positioning Solutions, Unleashing Your Full Business 
Potential, http://www.fleetboss.com/oursolutions.asp (last visited September 26, 
2005). 
 68 Although research for this Article uncovered a few examples of GPS-related 
legal authority, discussed infra notes 75–81, “much of the evidence regarding the 
breadth of GPS technology use by employers and abuse of the technology is 
anecdotal.”  Use of GPS Technology Growing, But Privacy Concerns Are Voiced, 176 Lab. 
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 15 (Analysis/News and Background Information) (2004).  Only five 
percent of companies recently surveyed by the American Management Association 
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For example, snowplow operators in Massachusetts69 rallied on the 
capitol steps and stormed a legislative hearing in Boston to protest a 
new requirement that they carry GPS enabled phones.70  In addition 
to their fears that the state would use surveillance data to challenge 
their time sheet entries, the plowers expressed concern that the 
technology might misinterpret idling in a traffic jam as sleeping on 
the job.71  Data collected through positioning systems tells only half of 
the story.  It provides only the “where and when” not the “why,” and 
as the snowplowers suggested, employers might fire workers based on 
an assumed, perhaps inaccurate, explanation for why an employee 
was at a particular place for a given amount of time.72
Examples of discipline based on assumptions drawn from 
positioning data can be found in the news and in court filings.  In 
Dallas, the owner of a car alarm installation company fired an 
employee after discovering, through use of a wireless tracking device, 
that the employee’s vehicle was in the parking lot of the Million 
Dollar Saloon (a strip club).73  And in In re Superior Products Inc.,74 a 
company fired an employee when it determined, using GPS tracking 
data, that his late deliveries resulted, at least in part, from his failure 
stated that “they use GPS technology to track company cell phones.”  Study Concludes 
Most Employers Monitor Employee Internet Usage, 177 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 138 
(Analysis/News and Background Information) (2005).  Lewis Maltby, president of 
the National Workrights Institute, concedes that “GPS use by employers is not a huge 
problem today,” but warns that “it has the potential to become a huge problem.”  Use 
of GPS Technology Growing, But Privacy Concerns Are Voiced, supra. 
 69 Note that the plowers, as state employees, could have raised objections to 
surveillance practices that would not apply in the context of private employment.  See 
LANE, supra note 8, at 11 (“If your employer is a government body, agency, or 
department, then generally speaking, the protections of the Constitution (and 
particularly the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search and 
seizure) do apply to you.”).  However, an employee’s discomfort with GPS 
surveillance and her reaction to her employer’s threat to use such technology is not 
necessarily tempered by her legal options.  As the anecdotes presented in Part II.D 
demonstrate, public and private employees alike chafe at the thought of being 
tagged and tracked.  For this reason, the personal stories of both public and private 
employees are relevant to this discussion. 
 70 Charles Forelle, On the Road Again, But Now the Boss Is Sitting Beside You, WALL 
ST. J., May 14, 2004, at A1. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See infra note 77 (discussing Senator John Edwards’ concerns about how GPS 
tracking data can be misinterpreted). 
 73 Simon Romero, Location Devices’ Use Rises, Prompting Privacy Concerns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, § 1, at 1.  Romero does not reveal whether the employee actually 
patronized the gentleman’s club or merely happened to leave his vehicle in the 
vicinity of that establishment.  Id. 
 74 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1623 (2002). 
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to take the most direct routes.75  The company refused to credit the 
employee’s explanation for the detours: his supervisor owed him 
$87.32 in toll reimbursements and he could not afford to front 
additional toll costs for his employer.76  When employers jump to 
conclusions about the on- and off-duty whereabouts of their 
employees, workers like those in these examples face harsh 
repercussions for what may be justifiable behavior.77
Discipline based on monitoring strictly off-duty conduct 
unrelated to theft or misuse of the employer’s property, the focus of 
this Article, provides perhaps the most troubling evidence of 
employers’ abuse of GPS services.  Such actions are not only 
unjustifiably intrusive, but, as the situation in Preferred Transportation, 
Inc.78 demonstrates, can also be used to mask an employer’s illegal 
reasons for firing an employee.  In Preferred Transportation, an 
employer terminated an employee for picking up extra passengers 
when the dispatcher ignored his calls for approval79 and for spending 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 1625. 
 77 As previously suggested, supra text accompanying note 73, the data gathered 
using GPS monitoring applications encourages employers to assume the worst about 
their employees.  When introducing the Location Privacy Protection Act, a bill aimed 
at restricting how companies use GPS technology to interact with their customers, see 
infra note 194, Senator John Edwards noted that “[l]ocation information is very 
private, sensitive information that can be misused . . . to draw inaccurate or 
embarrassing inferences about [people].”  147 CONG. REC. S7497 (2001).  In some 
instances, GPS tracking systems are a blunt tool for discerning what an employee is 
doing.  For example, what if the auto alarm employee, see supra note 73 and 
accompanying text, chose the Million Dollar Saloon parking space because the lot at 
a nearby grocery store was full?  This hardly justifies termination. 
Furthermore, technology can malfunction and place an employee in a location 
she never visited.  For example, one former BellSouth worker claims to have been 
discharged after the GPS system installed in his truck reported that the vehicle 
remained stationary for half a day, although written statements attested to his 
presence at various appointments.  Adventures in Blacksburg, http://www.jazybones. 
com/archives/000296.php (Mar. 1, 2002, 12:16 a.m.).  The same system also 
reported that the employee “drove to three jobs without ever starting the engine.”  
Id.  Admittedly, these are the claims of a disgruntled ex-employee; however, we have 
all experienced enough internet outages and losses of cell phone service to know 
that modern technology is not foolproof. 
 78 No. 21-CA-33407, 2003 NLRB LEXIS 236 (May 14, 2003) (decision of the 
administrative law judge reproduced in full at *20). 
 79 Id.  The case involved an airport shuttle service.  Id.  While driving more than 
one loop around the airport without permission, as the employee had done, 
technically violated policy, the discharged employee and a general manager testified 
that a second loop was generally acceptable under certain circumstances.  Id.  
Moreover, the company abolished these restrictions shortly after firing the employee.  
Id. at *31, *33.  Additionally, the judge dismissed the fact that the employee made 
more than three stops, another policy violation, as pretext for his termination 
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his entire lunch break at Home Depot and not, as the employee 
reported when asked, at Boston Market and then Home Depot.80  
Further inquiry revealed, however, that the employee was fired for his 
union activities, not, as alleged, for his inaccurate account of his 
whereabouts while off the company clock.81
Several commentators feel that these early examples of 
employees wronged by GPS tracking systems are a harbinger of a new 
breed of wrongful employment practices.  Drawing upon examples of 
innocent after-work activities that have cost people their jobs in the 
past, these authors describe how GPS tracking systems would enable 
employers to ascertain covertly what employees do away from the 
office, thus stripping them of control over the personal information 
they once chose whether or not to reveal at work.  One author 
describes how an employee’s regular stops at an AIDS clinic after 
work, discovered by his employer through GPS tracking technologies, 
might trigger dismissal.82  Another wonders: “[W]hat if your employer 
decides to lay you off because you stop at McDonald’s for lunch two 
days out of three and there’s concern that the cost of providing you 
health insurance and medical care will be increased by your 
weight?”83  Additionally, these authors predict that the situation will 
only get worse because “[i]ncreasingly[,] . . . the tools employers are 
using to gather legitimate information about how [employees are] 
because although “three or four drivers per week similarly violated the policy” the 
company had not disciplined anyone for such violations in the previous year.  Id. at 
*36 (emphasis added). 
 80 Id. at *39–42. 
 81 Id. at *2.  The driver involved was not a model employee.  Id.  The court held, 
however, that the discrepancies between his story and the GPS data recorded were 
part of a scheme designed solely “as a means to entrap him” in retribution for his 
protected union activities.  Id. at *9. 
 82 Aaron Renenger, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 549, 
557 (2002).  The facts of this scenario are likely based on those in Brunner v. Al Attar, 
786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).  In Brunner, an employer fired an employee 
who revealed that she spent her Saturdays, Sundays, and evenings volunteering with 
the AIDS Foundation.  He feared that her activities would “place himself, his family, 
and the office workers in jeopardy.”  Id. at 784–85; see also infra text accompanying 
note 97. 
 83 LANE, supra note 8, at 200.  The ACLU’s study on lifestyle discrimination may 
have inspired Lane’s example.  The report notes that, driven by economics, 
employers have, in the past, attempted to “broaden[] the sphere of their control to 
include what employees do in their own homes,” by “refus[ing] to hire people who 
drink, have high cholesterol levels, or ride motorcycles.”  American Civil Liberties 
Union, Legislative Briefing Kit: Lifestyle Discrimination (Dec. 31, 1998), http://www. 
aclu.org/WorkplaceRights/WorkplaceRights.cfm?ID=9080&c=34. 
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doing [their] job[s] are also being used to track how [they] spend 
[their] personal time.”84
In response, employees have taken some steps to curb abusive 
GPS monitoring.  Notably, UPS employees, aligned with the 
Teamster’s Union, negotiated a clause in their collective bargaining 
agreement that places some limits on the company’s use of 
information obtained via GPS receivers that are attached to trucks 
and scheduled to be embedded in job-related portable electronic 
devices.85  Likewise, the snowplowers discussed in this section secured 
concessions from the state and agreed to carry GPS-enabled phones 
as long as they were paid based on their manually submitted time 
sheets.86  But for the many non-unionized, private employees out 
there, these bargaining solutions are not feasible.87  Mere promises by 
employers not to discipline employees based on information 
gathered through electronic monitoring are not always binding in 
the private employment at-will context,88 and consequently these 
 84 LANE, supra note 8, at 187. 
 85 National Master United Parcel Service Agreement, art. 37, § 1(d) (2002), 
http://www.browncafe.net/public/upsnma (collective bargaining agreement 
between UPS and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, effective August 1, 
2002 through July 31, 2008, providing that “[n]o employee shall be disciplined for 
exceeding personal time based on data retrieved from the DIAD/IVIS [Delivery 
Information Acquisition Device] or other information technology”).  The agreement 
also requires that “the Employer shall not in any way intimidate . . . or overly 
supervise any employee in the performance of his or her duties.”  Id. art. 37, § 1(a).  
One might assume that protection from excessive supervision would extend to off-
duty conduct if it is prohibited during the workday, although the agreement does not 
specify this.  See also RECORDS MGMT. ASS’N OF AUSTRALASIA, TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 
REPORT: OCTOBER 2004, http://www.rmaa.com.au/docs/branches/nsw/pub/TISre 
port/2004/TIS200410.pdf (reporting that 500 Chicago city employees worked 
through their unions to secure concessions “allowing workers to shut down geo-
tracking features during lunch time and after hours”). 
 86 Forelle, supra note 70. 
 87 James, supra note 62 (“Although unionized employees . . . can fight the 
monitoring technologies, nonunion personnel have no legal recourse in the U.S., 
according to James T. Bennett, a professor at George Mason University who studies 
workplace privacy.”); see also Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Thomas Kochan, Taking 
Stock: Collective Bargaining at the Turn of the Century, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 3 
(Oct. 2004) (“Union membership in the private sector has fallen to below 9%—
essentially pre-New Deal levels.”); Transport Workers Union Local 562, United We 
Win: A Discussion of the Crisis Facing Workers and the Labor Movement (Feb. 
2003), http://www.twu562.org/unitedwewin.html (noting that only nine percent of 
the private workforce in the United States is unionized). 
 88 See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 98, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(allowing company to renege on its promise to workers to keep e-mail 
communications confidential and privileged, and holding that, in spite of this 
promise, the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable).  In the context of 
location monitoring, unofficial reports of broken promises not to use GPS tracking 
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employees have few options for recourse when their employers pry 
into their private lives.  Part III will further explore how existing legal 
protections fail to set reasonable limits on private employers who use 
GPS monitoring technologies. 
III.  EXISTING OFF-DUTY EMPLOYEE PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING LEGAL DOCTRINES 
Based on a survey of cases involving employers’ investigations of 
employee off-duty conduct, one treatise concludes that “[g]enerally, 
an employer appears to have a right . . . to investigate employee off-
duty conduct [when it relates to] a business interest of the  
employer . . . .”89  Because the law has come to expect that employers 
will protect their “employees . . . and the public from wrongdoing by 
employees,” courts have recognized a nexus between employers’ 
business interests and employees’ drug use, sexual activities, and 
other behavior away from the office.90  As a result, these interests have 
justified “a variety of [investigative] techniques [including] 
surveillance, wiretapping, interviews, polygraphs, and medical 
examinations.”91  In addition to this right to investigate and punish 
business-related, after-hours conduct, very little restrains employers 
from discharging employees at-will for activities that the employer 
finds repugnant and serendipitously learns about via office banter.  If 
these methods of investigation and the resulting consequences are 
currently lawful employment practices, then we have little reason to 
devices to discipline employees already exist.  ABC affiliate WJLA-TV installed GPS 
tracking devices “to dispatch crews quickly to breaking news, not to spy on them 
when they are on the road;” however, “[s]ources in the newsroom [reported that] at 
least two staffers [were] disciplined for using a company car for personal use or for 
speeding in a company car.”  Chris Baker, Channel 7 Uses GPS to Dispatch its Crews, 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at C11.  “‘We all understand we can’t take the company 
car to go to Ocean City for the weekend.  But is it OK to pick up milk or pizza on the 
way home?  All of these things were never questioned before we got the GPS system,’ 
one photographer said.”  Id. 
 89 1 WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, INVESTIGATING EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 7:15 (2004). 
 90 Id. (citing, among others, Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 980 P.2d 545, 549–50 
(Idaho 1999) (recognizing an employer’s interest in off-duty alcohol consumption by 
employees, which allegedly threatened the employer’s reputation, increased 
absenteeism, and hurt productivity); Hougum v. Valley Mem’l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 
812, 814–15, 822 (N.D. 1998) (holding that whether an ordained minister’s act of 
masturbating in a public restroom would negatively impact his “pastoral relationship” 
with the residents of an assisted living facility was a question of fact preventing 
summary judgment); French v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 128, 130–31 
(D. Mass. 1998) (recognizing an employer’s interest in an off-site, drunken, 
emotional outburst because this behavior called into question the soundness of a 
supervisory employee’s judgment)). 
 91 HARTSFIELD, supra note 89, § 7:15. 
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expect that plaintiffs will fare any better in cases challenging 
dismissals or discipline based on GPS data. 
A. The Employer’s Existing Dominion over Off-Duty Conduct 
The law’s permissive approach to employers’ inquiries into 
employees’ personal lives leaves workers with few defenses against the 
employer’s intrusive gaze.  In a world where most private 
employment is at-will, meaning that either the employee or the 
employer can terminate the relationship “at any time . . . for any 
reason or no reason at all,”92 many employees mistakenly believe, 
perhaps because of their faith in the Constitution, that they have 
some right to privacy.  What these innocents fail to recognize is that 
“every single day, tens of millions of us spend hours in offices, 
cubicles, kitchens, laundry rooms, and work sites where the U.S. 
Constitution is completely inapplicable.”93  Private employers are not 
bound by constitutional provisions like the Fourth Amendment’s 
Search and Seizure Clause, which limits intrusions by government 
employers.94  Admittedly, anti-discrimination laws,95 which effectively 
require even private employers to adhere to the Equal Protection 
demands of the Fourteenth Amendment, introduce a fragment of 
constitutional law into the private workplace.  However, most of these 
protections, except perhaps the protections that guard against 
 92 Jason P. Lemons, Comment, For Any Reason or No Reason at All: Reconciling 
Employment at Will with the Rights of Texas Workers After Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. 
v. Solomon, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 741, 743 (citing John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer 
Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 467 
(1980)).  The original rule, a departure from the practice in England, debuted in 
Horace Gay Wood’s much debated piece entitled Master and Servant in 1877.  STEVEN 
L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 79, 81 (3d ed. 2002). 
 93 LANE, supra note 8, at 10. 
 94 This Article does not address how GPS tracking might be limited in the 
context of public employment and often assumes that public employees would fare 
better than private employees under current legal conditions, given the 
Constitutional restraints placed on the government’s ability to invade privacy.  
However, the Oregon Supreme Court cast doubt on this theory when it upheld the 
use of GPS technology to track the employer-provided vehicle of a United States 
Forest Service employee.  State v. Meredith, 96 P.3d 342, 346 (Or. 2004) (holding 
that under the search and seizure clause of the state constitution “defendant did not 
have a protected privacy interest in keeping her location and work-related activities 
concealed from . . . observation by her employer [conducted using a GPS] 
transmitter”).  The government might be just as free to use GPS tracking technologies 
as private employers.  See also infra Part IV.A (discussing government’s use of GPS 
technology to track criminal suspects and parolees). 
 95 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000) (Title VII, covering discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(2000) (Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000) (Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)). 
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religious discrimination, get at traits (race, gender, age) and not 
activities—unless the plaintiff can make some connection between, 
for example, race and a particular after-hours pursuit.  Consequently, 
going to work each day for a private employer “is, essentially, the 
equivalent of traveling each day to a foreign nation”96 where the 
rights we often take for granted largely do not apply. 
Although restrained in narrow circumstances by tort principles 
and statutory exceptions that will be explored in detail in Part III.B, 
the employment-at-will doctrine gives private employers free reign to 
fire employees for a seemingly limitless number of reasons that 
include displeasure with how an employee spends her off-duty hours.  
For example, employers have fired or not hired workers for providing 
volunteer service at an AIDS clinic,97 for attending law school at 
night,98 and for being smokers.99  Recently, an employer fired a case 
manager with thirteen years of commendable service “because of her 
membership in Women’s Garden Circle, an investment group [her 
employer] believed to be an illegal pyramid scheme.”100  Already 
empowered with a right to fire employees for activities voluntarily 
revealed, GPS tracking services will enable employers to discover 
covertly an employee’s outside interests and use these extracurriculars 
against him or her.  While employees with a “just cause” clause in 
their contracts can challenge being fired for any reason, because 
employers must “demonstrate that the employee’s off-duty 
misconduct . . . has the potential to adversely affect the business,”101 
the standard at-will employee does not have this guarantee.  In 
general, even the exceptions to the formidable at-will-employment 
doctrine are unlikely to provide any shelter from the boss’ prying 
eyes.  Still, an examination of these and other legal doctrines is 
warranted before considering what protections the law should afford. 
 96 LANE, supra note 8, at 10. 
 97 Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
 98 Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). 
 99 City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995) (holding that 
refusing to hire applicants based on their smoking habit does not violate a 
constitutional right to privacy because “individuals must reveal whether they smoke 
in almost every aspect of life in today’s society” and thus cannot assert a legitimate 
expectation of privacy); Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public 
Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 951 (1987). 
 100 Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 101 Daniel J. McCoy, Recent Privacy Law Developments Affecting the Workplace, 788 
PLI/PAT. 435, 478 (2004). 
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B. Existing Legal Resources and Limits on their Protections 
Although largely vulnerable to the whims of his employer, the at-
will employee is not totally without recourse when terminated.  In 
addition to the anti-discrimination laws previously discussed, tort law 
also offers some remedies for more egregious abuses of the 
employer’s power to fire.102  These additional limits on the 
employment-at-will doctrine, however, do not clearly prevent 
employers from manipulating the after-hours pursuits of their 
employees.  Recognizing this shortcoming, several states have 
provided statutory protection for certain off-duty activities.  However, 
these statutes, along with the one federal law that could arguably 
provide employees with a scintilla of privacy, would, like their 
common law counterparts, fall short of protecting employees from a 
gratuitous program of after-hours, location-based monitoring.  The 
following discussion further demonstrates that employees tracked 
during after-hours activities currently lack legal protection. 
1. Common Law Doctrines 
Employees may “cede control over many of their waking hours as 
the price of being employed by another,”103 but the common law has 
developed some limits on what an employer can extract from an 
employee in exchange for a wage.  An employer cannot order its 
employees to take action that undermines “the interests of the 
general community.”104  Nor can an employer claim immunity from 
privacy tort claims.  Still, because “we tend to look to the market to 
chasten abuses of employer power,”105 courts have been very 
 102 Although the premise behind the employment-at-will doctrine is that both 
employer and employee have equal opportunity to end the relationship, this 
overlooks that in most cases, where an employer has many employees and an 
employee has but one employer, the damage an employee can do to the employer’s 
finances by quitting pales in comparison to the damage an employer can do to an 
employee’s financial situation by firing her.  Therefore, while “at will” is often seen as 
equally dividing power over the employer-employee relationship, this view is 
somewhat blind to the reality of the dynamics in this relationship.  The employer 
retains a great deal of “power.” 
 103 2 L. CAMILLE HERBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 13:3 (2004). 
 104 Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 679 (1996). 
 105 Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 221, 256 (1996) (explaining that this situation has come about “[n]ot 
[because] we value privacy less, but [because] we seem to value legal non-
intervention more”). 
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conservative in their willingness to find for employees in suits alleging 
violations of these common law protections.106
a. Employment-at-Will and Tortious Wrongful Discharge 
As noted, employment-at-will is the default assumption in private 
employment unless the parties specify otherwise.  Yet certain 
doctrines have weakened the once absolute power of the employer to 
fire “for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.”107  States have 
adopted, in various combinations,108 up to four theories of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.  These subsets of the wrongful 
discharge doctrine protect employees who exercise statutory rights,109 
fulfill public obligations,110 “report the company’s unlawful conduct 
to a supervisor or outside authorities”111 (whistleblowers), or refuse to 
commit unlawful acts.112  Generally, these intrusions into the private 
employer-employee relationship have been justified because of the 
third-party harms that might result when employees fail to follow the 
law or to fulfill public duties as a result of pressure from employers.113  
An employer can thus, under common law, fire someone for any 
reason—except one that constitutes wrongful discharge in the given 
state. 
However, the doctrine “has never been extended to terminations 
in retaliation for conduct outside the employment relationship.”114  
 106 See, e.g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 179 (Conn. 2000) 
(denying the wrongful discharge claim of a secretary who “filed an anonymous 
complaint with the Connecticut State Dental Association . . . alleging that the 
defendants engaged in unsanitary and unhealthy practices in violation of the federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Act”).  To justify this decision, the court stated: 
“[W]e note our adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the 
general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is 
a narrow one.  We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the 
exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation.”  Id. at 182 
(citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107 Cynthia G. Dooley, Note, Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, the 
Public Concern Requirement, and Employees’ Private Lives, 11 REV. LITIG. 387, 388 (1991) 
(paraphrasing Payne v. W. Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884)). 
 108 See, e.g., Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784, 785–86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) 
(observing that Texas only recognizes “two exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine” and refusing to add to the list). 
 109 Id. (“The classic example is filing a claim for benefits under the workers’ 
compensation statute.”). 
 110 Id. (“The classic example is serving on jury duty.”). 
 111 Id. 
 112 WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 92, at 150. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Wis. 2002) 
(declining to recognize a cause of action under the public policy exception to the 
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Thus, the success of an employee’s wrongful discharge claim 
challenging a dismissal for off-duty activities discovered through GPS 
tracking techniques would depend entirely on the willingness of the 
court to fit the employee’s activities into one of the recognized 
exceptions.115  Given how narrowly courts interpret these exceptions, 
this possibility seems unlikely.116  Are employees exercising a 
“statutory right” if they go to a bar after work simply because alcohol 
consumption is legal?  Does working on a political campaign after 
clocking out fulfill a public obligation, or does it merely constitute a 
good deed?  In both instances, an employee would likely fail in a suit 
against his employer because courts generally look for a very specific 
statutory right related to employment117 and, unlike jury duty, many 
volunteer activities that provide public benefits are not obligations.118
employment-at-will doctrine when an employer fired an employee whose husband 
had participated in the arrest of the employer’s wife for driving while under the 
influence). 
 115 Relying on the court to extend the public policy exception is particularly risky 
because courts have not applied a consistent methodology when evaluating such 
requests.  See WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 92, at 151–52 (discussing how some courts 
define “public policy” more broadly than others and consequently recognize more 
instances of wrongful discharge); see also Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes 
and the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 
993 (2000) (accusing common law courts of making ad hoc determinations 
regarding the legal basis for common law discharge accountability). 
 116 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 633–34 (Nev. 1995) (rejecting a 
claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy brought against an employer 
who allegedly fired the plaintiff for arguing that “[b]lacks have rights, too” because 
“the remark . . . was not made in opposition or objection to the company’s supposed 
discriminatory policies”).  Seemingly, even a practice that contravenes anti-
discrimination laws may not satisfy courts’ high standards for wrongful termination.   
As long as Bullard was not fired for refusing to participate in or interfering with his 
employer’s racially discriminatory practices, his discharge did not violate public 
policy.  Id. 
 117 See, e.g., Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183, 186–87 (E.D. Pa. 1995) 
(holding that the state’s divorce code was merely a “vague and general expression of 
the legislature’s view concerning the importance of family unity” and was insufficient 
to support a wrongful discharge claim where the employer fired an employee who 
refused his employer’s request that he divorce his wife); Johnson v. Carpenter Tech. 
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 180, 184–85 (D. Conn. 1989) (rejecting employee’s wrongful 
discharge claim based on violation of a drug testing procedure statute for employers 
that was passed after the employee was fired for not taking a test); Karren v. Far W. 
Fed. Savings, 717 P.2d 1271, 1273–74 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (firing an employee for 
getting engaged may have interfered with a “right to marry,” but this right was a 
private right, unrelated to her role as an employee); see also Roberts v. Alan Ritchey, 
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (expressing doubt that the 
presumption of innocence provided by statute in Ohio created a public policy that 
was violated when an employer discharged an employee for driving under the 
influence, a charge that was later dropped).  Narrowly decided cases like the 
examples provided here made it necessary for states to enact statutes to prevent 
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b. Privacy Torts 
Given the tortious wrongful discharge doctrine’s limitations, 
employees scrutinized beyond reason might turn to simple tort claims 
for relief.  The common law includes a tort for the invasion of 
privacy, which proscribes four types of activity: intrusion upon 
seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, public disclosure of 
private facts, and false light.119  Two of these branches, intrusion upon 
seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, are potentially 
relevant in a case involving after-hours, location-based monitoring.  
The former tort can be asserted against the employer while the latter 
might be brought against either the employer or the GPS service 
provider.  The following subsections describe how each version of the 
invasion of privacy tort might apply in employee tracking cases. 
(1) Unreasonable Intrusion on the Right of Seclusion 
The prima facie elements of an intrusion upon seclusion claim 
include: “(1) an intentional invasion or intrusion; (2) that is highly 
offensive to a reasonable person; (3) occurring where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”120  Particularly relevant to an 
examination of a GPS monitoring case, the tortious invasion need not 
be physical, as “use of the defendant’s senses, with or without 
mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private 
affairs”121 also qualifies as an actionable invasion.  Moreover, “[t]he 
employees from being fired for legal off-duty activities.  See discussion infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 118 See Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1032–33 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that dismissal for pro bono work advocating equal rights for 
homosexuals does not violate public policy). 
 119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).  This provision summarizes 
the ways in which the right of privacy can be invaded: 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 
§ 652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; 
or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in 
§ 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before 
the public, as stated in § 652E. 
Id. 
 120 Corbett, supra note 10, at 109–10 (paraphrasing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652B (1977) (“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”)). 
 121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). 
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intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though 
there is no [use] of the . . . information.”122
The reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, however, 
impedes employees’ abilities to bring intrusion upon seclusion cases 
against employers.123  Logically, this result makes sense, for “so long as 
the individual is in a public place, it is unlikely that she can maintain 
an argument that there was a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”124  
Several courts have consequently denied privacy claims brought 
against employers who videotaped their employees engaged in off-
duty activities that “could be seen . . . by anyone driving by.”125  
Additionally, the intrusion upon seclusion tort claim can easily be 
undermined by employers who simply notify employees that devices 
with GPS tracking capabilities may watch them around the clock—
thus eviscerating any reasonable expectation of privacy that an 
employee might otherwise have had. 
Still, although “[t]he law has long recognized that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a public place . . . one does not 
reasonably expect that she will be stalked and followed.”126  Some 
authors have argued that case law supports a reasonable expectation 
of some privacy even in public places.  The “mere observation of a 
person’s public activities [might not be] an intrusion upon 
seclusion.”127  However, an “[overzealous] sensory observation of a 
 122 Id. 
 123 As one commentator observed, “Most invasion of privacy claims in the 
employment context fail because courts find either that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy or that the invasion would not be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person or both.”  Corbett, supra note 10, at 110. 
 124 Karim, supra note 36, at 508–09. 
 125 York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
employee’s privacy was not invaded when the employer, as part of an investigation of 
a workers’ compensation claim, videotaped the employee “in his yard, driving on 
public streets, and walking in public places” because “these activities were . . . open to 
the public”); I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 689–90 (Ala. 2000) 
(“Because the activities Jones carried on in his front yard[, including his urinating,] 
could have been observed by any passerby, we conclude that any intrusion by ICU 
into Jones’s privacy was not ‘wrongful’ and, therefore, was not actionable.”); McLain 
v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 345 (Or. 1975) (upholding a grant of nonsuit 
for an invasion of privacy claim because the “activities which were filmed could have 
been observed by . . . neighbors or passersby on the road”). 
 126 White, supra note 40, at 1. 
 127 Sheri L. Caldwell et al., 2002 John Marshall National Moot Court Competition in 
Information Technology and Privacy Law: Brief for the Petitioner, 21 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 59, 74 (2002) (citing Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 
765, 771 (N.Y. 1970)); see also HARTSFIELD, supra note 89,  § 7:13 (“Mere gathering of 
information about an individual usually does not give rise to a claim for invasion of 
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person’s activities in public . . . [might] be an actionable intrusion.”128  
The possibility of success on an intrusion of seclusion claim for after-
hours geographic tracking of employees therefore may not be 
completely foreclosed, but it is questionable at best.  Moreover, an 
expectation that one cannot be stalked, like the more general 
reasonable expectation of privacy, may be just as susceptible to 
obliteration through notice from the employer. 
(2) Publicity Given to a Private Life 
Alternatively, in a case against an employer and/or the company 
that provides the tracking technology, the tort for publicity given to a 
private life might apply.  The tort states in full that 
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life 
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the matter publicized is the kind that (a) would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.129
But success on such a claim in an employee tracking case will be 
difficult, given the accepted definitions of “publicized” and “private 
life” used in an analysis of this tort. 
The comments accompanying the definition of publicity given to 
a private life in the Second Restatement of Torts clearly state that “it is 
not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this 
Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life 
to a single person or even to a small group of persons.”130  Thus, a 
GPS service provider’s act of supplying an employer with the 
information obtained from its tracking system would not constitute 
publicizing—even if the information was published on a website—as 
privacy. . . . However, aggressive surveillance of even public acts can serve as grounds 
for an invasion of privacy claim.” (citations omitted)). 
 128 Id.; see also Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 383–84 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1989) (examining an employee’s invasion of privacy claim against his employer, 
where an investigator “posed as a process server for the purpose of looking around 
the plaintiff’s home” and used a powerful camera lens to look through the plaintiff’s 
windows.  The court reasoned that “[i]t may not be objectionable to peer through an 
open window where the curtains are not drawn, but the use of a powerful lens to 
observe the interior of a home or of a subterfuge to enter a home could be found 
objectionable to a reasonable person.”).  But see Baggs v. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 
957 F.2d 268, 275 (6th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the right of “a Michigan employer 
[to] use intrusive and even objectionable means to obtain employment-related 
information about an employee” in a case involving an employee’s refusal to take an 
employer-administered drug test after undercover police surveillance reported that 
sixty percent of employees used illegal drugs). 
 129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 130 Id. cmt. a. 
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long as only a select group of supervisors has access to the site.131  The 
wide dissemination of information, not its mere recording or 
discovery, triggers the protection against publicity.132  This reality also 
cripples use of the publicity tort against an employer, for as long as 
the employer uses the tracking information only to discharge or to 
discipline an employee, and does not post the facts discovered in the 
break room for all to see, the publicity requirement will not be 
satisfied.133
Even if the publicity requirement were not an obstacle, 
employees suing service providers and employers would also struggle 
to show that the information revealed concerned the employee’s 
private life.  The Restatement asserts that “there is no liability for giving 
further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the 
public eye.”134  Therefore, “[a]n individual . . . would most likely have 
no cause of action under the publicity tort, so long as the information 
 131 Many of the GPS service providers allow their customers to access fleet and 
employee management data via the Internet.  See, e.g., Comet Tracker Technology, 
http://www.comettracker.com/technology.html. 
 132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977) (“‘Publicity,’ as it is 
used in this Section, differs from ‘publication’ . . . . ‘Publication,’ in [other contexts], 
is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third 
person.  ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by 
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must 
be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”); see also 
Renenger, supra note 82, at 557 (“Recovery is also not available if the fact the person 
desires to keep private is not widely circulated by a defendant, but only released to a 
select group of people.  Thus, if an employer decides not to hire a job applicant 
because, through exploitation of cell-phone data, the employer discovers that the 
applicant makes weekly visits to an AIDS clinic, there would be no cause of action 
against the party who released the location data for publication of private 
information.”). 
 133 Even dissemination to a limited group of non-supervisory co-workers does not 
appear to constitute “publicity.”  See Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 
559 (Utah 2000) (awarding summary judgment to the employer even though the 
employer allowed a group of ten employees to view footage capturing the plaintiff’s 
sexual assault); see also Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437–38 (E.D. Pa. 1983) 
(revealing the terms of an employee’s discharge to two persons who did not have an 
employment related need for this information does not constitute “publicity” as 
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652D); Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 
77–78 (Okla. 1986) (holding that a discussion of plaintiff’s medical condition among 
“only a small group of co-workers” did not constitute publicity of private affairs).  But 
see Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (recognizing a 
cause of action for public disclosure of private facts when the publicity was not 
widespread because “where a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the 
‘public’ to whom the information has been disclosed, [as is the case among fellow 
employees,] the disclosure may be just as devastating to the person even though the 
disclosure was made to a limited number of people”). 
 134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). 
YUNG FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  11:28:21 AM 
192 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:163 
 
is collected in public areas.”135  The publicity tort suffers from the 
same limitation common to most of the invasion of privacy torts—one 
generally cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard 
to activities in public places.  If an employee walks into a bar after 
work, in plain view of the community, she cannot bring an invasion of 
privacy claim against her teetotaler employer who tracks her 
movements and fires her for taking a drink. 
More generally, both the common law claims discussed in this 
section, wrongful discharge and the invasion of privacy tort, are not 
fully equipped to address an employee’s dismissal for after-hours 
activities discovered through off-duty electronic surveillance.  The 
discussion here recognizes how these doctrines might be read to 
support some protection for an employee, but also reveals that the 
law would still need to evolve before tracked employees could truly 
rely on its protections.  Waiting for common law evolution is not, 
however, an adequate solution to the problem presented by location-
based employee tracking.  “Such judicial activism would . . . be 
piecemeal by nature and would not provide uniform protection of 
workplace privacy rights.  Employees who suffer similar intrusions will 
often receive differing protection of their privacy rights.”136  Such a 
solution would also be untenable from the employer’s perspective, 
given that many employers operate in multiple states and some 
manage a workforce that crosses state lines.  National employers 
would have difficultly developing programs that comply with the 
protections provided by various common law doctrines, assuming that 
state courts are ready and willing to extend their jurisprudence. 
2. State Laws Protecting Legal Activity Outside of Work 
Like the common law doctrines discussed in the last section, 
existing state laws also fail to provide protection for employees 
monitored after hours.  State laws protecting after-work activities have 
effectively balanced employers’ and employees’ interests in some 
specific contexts, but the protected categories are narrow and/or full 
of exceptions.  Additionally, state laws suffer from the same lack of 
uniformity as the common law.  Therefore, this Article ultimately 
advocates for a federal solution to the employee tracking problem.  
However, an examination of these state laws provides some guidance 
on how employees’ off-duty interests can be protected from employer 
scrutiny through targeted and balanced legislation. 
 135 Karim, supra note 36, at 508. 
 136 Wilborn, supra note 24, at 855. 
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At last count, nearly three-fifths of the states had some law 
restricting the ability of employers to take action against employees 
based on their pursuits after work.137  “The statutes range from merely 
protecting the rights of smokers to protecting all off-duty conduct 
 . . . .”138  Many of these statutes were, however, enacted for the very 
limited purpose of providing employees with a right to use certain 
products not proscribed by law.139  The few statutes that do protect a 
more general category of off-duty conduct tend to provide employers 
with an exception for conduct that conflicts with the employer’s 
business interests.140  As a result, even in states with more generous 
 137 See Pagnattaro, supra note 58, at 629 n.9. 
 138 Id. at 629. 
 139 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e)(2) (2003).  Professor Pagnattaro provides a 
comprehensive list of the statutes prohibiting discharge for smoking and use of other 
products after hours: 
The following state[] statutes prohibit an employer from infringing on 
an employee’s right to use tobacco products outside of work: ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 36-601.02(f) (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1703.03 (2001); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(3) 
(Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (West 2003); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2003); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West 
2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-11-3 (Michie 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40,  
§ 500 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.315 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
20.7.1-1.(a) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law Co-op. 2003); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504 
(Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-
105(a)(iv) (Michie 2002).  The following states make it unlawful for an 
employer to punish an employee for using lawful products off-duty: 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/5 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. § 181.938 
(2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 613.333 (Michie 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2003); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.35 (West 2003). 
Pagnattaro, supra note 58, at 629 n.9.  However, even these seemingly straightforward 
laws do not guarantee an unfettered right to use the products specified.  For 
example, the South Dakota legislature qualified its right to smoke after hours with a 
bona fide occupational qualification exception.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11(1) 
(Michie 2003).  In Wood v. South Dakota Cement Plant, the state supreme court held 
that an assistant kiln operator, who would work in a dusty environment and in 
extreme temperatures, could be prohibited from smoking while off-duty, despite the 
statute’s protections.  588 N.W.2d 227, 230–31 (S.D. 1999). 
 140 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2003) (declaring unlawful an 
employer’s termination of an employee for the employee’s participation “in any 
lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours [that is 
unrelated] to a bona fide occupational requirement”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q 
(West Supp. 2005) (protecting an employee’s off-duty exercise of constitutional 
rights as long as the employee’s activities “[do] not substantially or materially 
interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the working relationship 
between the employee and the employer”); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 201-d(2)(c), (3)(a) 
(McKinney 2003) (prohibiting dismissal for “an individual’s legal recreational 
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off-duty activity protections, an employer could still take action 
against a frequent consumer of Big Macs141 if the position at issue 
required a certain standard of physical health.  Under these laws, an 
employer would need only to find a way to couch its objections to an 
employee’s activities in business interest terms to justify using the 
information from a GPS monitoring system to fire an employee.  In 
sum, these laws have effectively accomplished their goals by providing 
some off-duty privacy, but most are too specific to cover many of the 
activities that GPS monitoring might discover.142  Even the state laws 
that offer broader protection are limited in ways that might 
undermine an employee’s attempts to keep his personal activities 
separate from his qualifications as an employee.143
activities outside work hours, off of the employer’s premises and without use of the 
employer’s equipment or other property” unless it “creates a material conflict of 
interest related to the employer’s trade secrets, proprietary information or other 
proprietary or business interest”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (1997) (protecting 
“participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during nonworking hours 
which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the 
employer”). 
 141 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 142 See supra note 139 (listing the many laws protecting only one activity—
smoking—that takes place away from the office). 
 143 California appeared to have created a broad, absolute protection for after-work 
activities when it amended its labor code to allow the Labor Commissioner to pursue 
claims for lost wages resulting from discharge based on off-duty activities.  CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 96(k) (West 2004) (providing the Labor Commissioner with the power to 
“take assignment of . . . claims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, 
or discharge for the lawful conduct occurring during non-working hours away from 
the employer’s premises”).  “Rather surprisingly, [section 96(k)] of the California 
Labor Code [did] not contain any exceptions, like those contained in similar statutes 
in New York, North Dakota and Colorado . . . .”  Pagnattaro, supra note 58, at 647–48.  
But subsequent interpretation by the Attorney General severely limited the scope of 
the law and its usefulness.  In response to a state senator’s inquiry as to whether 
“peace officers could be disciplined for engaging in lawful activities during non-
working hours if such activities were inconsistent with their duties as peace officers,” 
the Attorney General responded that, if warranted, law enforcement may discipline 
officers for such activities.  83 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 226 (2000), 2000 WL 1514816 
(“Courts have long recognized that, while the off-duty conduct of employees is 
generally of no legal consequence to their employers, the public expects peace 
officers to be ‘above suspicion of violation of the very laws [they are] sworn . . . to 
enforce.’”) (quoting Pasadena Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Pasadena, 797 P.2d 608, 
611 (Cal. 1990)) (alterations in original).  Although tailored to the unique role of 
peace officers, the opinion included a sweeping statement that “the 1999 
amendment of section 96 did not create new substantive rights for employees.  
Rather, it established a procedural mechanism that allows the Commissioner to 
assert, on behalf of employees, their independently recognized constitutional rights” 
or other rights “exist[ing] elsewhere in the law.”  Id. 
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3. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1996 
Existing federal laws covering various forms of electronic 
monitoring likewise cannot offer the tracked employee any relief.  
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1996 (“ECPA”)144 is 
not applicable to a discussion of GPS tracking systems, although it is 
often discussed in analyses of other forms of employee surveillance 
technologies, including programs that monitor Internet use and 
employee e-mail.145  “[U]nlike pen registers and other electronic trap 
and trace devices, the Privacy Act requirements of consent or 
authorization do not apply to electronic signals from a tracking 
device, because no communication is involved.”146  Although 
information about someone’s whereabouts does arguably 
communicate information about that person, the statute specifically 
does not cover “any communication from a tracking device,”147 which 
is defined as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the 
tracking of the movement of a person or object.”148  Therefore, a 
detailed discussion of this act is not warranted.  The act has limited, if 
any, usefulness as a tool for protecting the privacy of employees 
under GPS surveillance. 
As this section demonstrates, existing statutes and common laws 
remain too narrow to encompass the situation where an employer 
monitors employees after hours simply to exercise more control over 
the personalities it employs.  Thus, the law fails, at this time, to 
provide any shelter from the pervasive stare of GPS satellites in the 
employment context.  However, as the next section explains, people 
are not similarly exposed in other contexts.  An inconsistent legal 
framework that shields the personal errands of law-abiding citizens 
from the prying gaze of almost everyone except employers is hard to 
defend. 
IV. HOW GPS TECHNOLOGY IS REGULATED IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
Use of GPS technology to monitor people’s movements has 
ruffled feathers outside of the employment arena as well.  The 
technology has been used by law enforcement to track criminal 
 144 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521, 2701–2712 (2000). 
 145 See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 4, at 295–96 (noting that the ECPA “is normally 
interpreted to encompass e-mail”). 
 146 State v. Jackson, 46 P.3d 257, 270 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (dismissing claims 
challenging use of GPS to track a criminal suspect based on state privacy law). 
 147 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(c) (“‘electronic communication’ . . . does not include . . . 
any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title)”). 
 148 Id. § 3117(b). 
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suspects and parolees.  Businesses that rent equipment to customers 
have also used GPS devices to survey the location of their property 
and how it is used.  The legal and political worlds’ responses to these 
various uses of GPS technology therefore offer additional ideas for 
how to structure a policy governing the remote supervision of 
employees.  Right now, the law’s treatment of employees most closely 
resembles the paradigm for acceptable uses of GPS tracking 
technologies in law enforcement.  This section argues that the 
treatment of criminal suspects is a poor model for how employees 
should be treated. 
A. Use of GPS in Law Enforcement 
Currently, the law regarding the use of GPS by police officers is 
in flux.  Law enforcement has, for some time, used a variety of 
sensory-enhancing aids to apprehend criminals.  Consequently, many 
courts, analogizing GPS to other acceptable uses of technology, have 
no problem with officers using these devices to enforce the law more 
efficiently.149  A few courts, however, have more carefully considered 
how GPS devices might be more intrusive than other approved 
tracking technologies—to the point of warranting a different 
doctrine.150  Still, in most contexts, GPS tracking technology can be 
used to apprehend suspects and monitor convicted criminals.151
1. Monitoring Suspects 
As noted, officers in the past have used other technologies to 
track suspects.  One precursor of GPS appears to have been “the 
beeper,” a radio transmitter that emitted periodic signals capable of 
being “heard” by a radio receiver.152  Although the beeper did not 
resemble a GPS tracking system in form or function, it served a 
similar purpose: the beeper could be used to track vehicles, their 
operators, and virtually any object that harbored the device.  Because 
of its widespread use, even the Supreme Court has addressed 
electronic tracking as part of law enforcement surveillance. 
In United States v. Knotts,153 law enforcement officers planted a 
beeper in a can of chemicals purchased by a suspected manufacturer 
 149 See infra notes 152–60, 172–77 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 151 Schumann, supra note 19, at 60 (“[T]o date there is no Fourth Amendment 
bar to GPS track evidence.”). 
 152 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
 153 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
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of illegal drugs.154  The officers had the suspect under visual 
surveillance, but when they lost sight of the suspect’s vehicle, they 
relied on the beeper to determine the location of the chemicals.155  In 
rejecting the defendant’s claim that this electronic surveillance 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights against illegal searches and 
seizures,156 the Court held that “beepers are merely a more effective 
means of observing what is already public.”157  As long as officers do 
not use electronic surveillance to go where they could not legally 
follow, the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights remain intact.158
In United States v. Karo,159 another case involving a beeper 
implanted in a can of ingredients for drugs, the Court further refined 
the Knotts rule.160  The Court distinguished Karo on its facts because 
in Karo, the defendants actually brought the bugged can of chemicals 
into a private residence, a place that officers could not legally observe 
without a search warrant. Consequently, the Court held that the 
information obtained from the continued monitoring of the 
container after it left the public view could not be used against the 
defendant.  However, the Court reversed the appellate court’s 
suppression of evidence obtained using a search warrant that was 
based on the electronic surveillance data because the warrant 
affidavit would have still been sufficient even if the facts gleaned from 
unconstitutional surveillance were excluded.161  More relevant to the 
discussion at hand, though, is the general rule that Knotts and Karo 
stand for: the government can track people right up to their front 
doors without violating a legally recognized privacy interest. 
Recent decisions reveal that the applicability of the Karo/Knotts 
reasoning in a GPS tracking case remains unclear.  In State v. 
Jackson,162 the police installed GPS tracking devices on cars 
impounded as part of an investigation into the disappearance and 
 154 Id. at 278–79. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Although Fourth Amendment rights do not apply to private employer-
employee arrangements, a discussion of criminal cases is relevant to the arguments 
made in this Article because, as the discussion will demonstrate, in an unregulated 
state, an employee harassed through after-hours surveillance has rights comparable 
to those of criminal suspects and parolees, rather than the significantly greater 
protections afforded to consumers and other law-abiding groups. 
 157 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
 158 Id. at 284–85 (dicta). 
 159 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 160 Id. at 708. 
 161 Id. at 721 n.7. 
 162 46 P.3d 257 (Wash. App. 2002). 
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suspected murder of William Jackson’s nine year-old daughter.163  
The appellate court rejected Jackson’s challenge to the adequacy of 
the procedures used to obtain a warrant for installation of the 
tracking devices because, under Karo, Knotts, and their progeny, “no 
search warrant was required under the state or federal constitution to 
use the GPS devices . . . .”164  Echoing the reasoning in Knotts, the 
court declared that “[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . does not prohibit 
use of scientific enhancements to augment sensory faculties used to 
observe what is already open to the public.”165
But the Washington Supreme Court accepted Jackson’s petition 
for review166 and ultimately disagreed with the appellate court’s 
analysis.167  The court reasoned that “the GPS device does not merely 
augment the officers’ senses, but rather provides a technological 
substitute for traditional visual tracking.”168  Because a GPS device can 
“disclose a great deal about an individual’s life” by “reveal[ing] 
preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails, and foibles” the 
court held that such tracking constitutes an invasion that, when 
conducted without a warrant, violates the protections of the state 
constitution’s search and seizure clause.169  The court still upheld 
Jackson’s conviction and sentence, however, because the officers had 
obtained valid warrants before installing the tracking devices.170
Although presently limited to an interpretation of the 
Washington State Constitution, Jackson may become the rule of law 
for evaluating GPS surveillance procedures under the Federal 
Constitution.171  The Washington Supreme Court suggested that GPS 
devices differ in relevant ways from an electronic beeper, which 
 163 Id. at 260–61. 
 164 Id. at 270–72. 
 165 Id. at 270. 
 166 State v. Jackson, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003). 
 167 State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003). 
 168 Id. at 223. 
 169 Id. at 223–24.  Jackson did not base his appeal on the lower court’s Fourth 
Amendment holding and consequently, the Washington Supreme Court did not 
address the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking under the Federal 
Constitution. 
 170 Id. at 220. 
 171 The Washington Privacy Clause, which states “[n]o person shall be disturbed 
in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law,” WASH. CONST. 
art. I, § 7, is “much more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth 
Amendment,” Schumann, supra note 19, at 9.  Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
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officers must actively follow in a manner similar to chasing a vehicle 
through the streets.  In contrast, GPS goes one step further, enabling 
officers to “watch” a suspect for weeks at a time.  Without leaving the 
station or putting forth much effort, officers can obtain a detailed 
trail of a suspect’s past and present location.172  Still, other courts 
have comfortably extended the beeper doctrine to GPS devices.  In 
United States v. McIver,173 the Ninth Circuit held that a warrantless use 
of both GPS and beeper tracking devices was not unconstitutional 
because tracking a vehicle “thrust into the public eye . . . does not 
constitute a ‘search.’”174
2. Monitoring Parolees 
Likewise, a California appellate court in People v. Zichwic175 
upheld law enforcement’s use of GPS devices, albeit in the context of 
monitoring parolees and not suspects.176  Zichwic concluded that 
attaching a GPS tracking device to a parolee’s car did not require a 
warrant, for even if such activity could be considered a search, 
Zichwic’s status as a parolee, and the reduced expectation of privacy 
that necessarily accompanies such status, justified using the device.177  
The court also observed, in dicta, that regardless of Zichwic’s status as 
a parolee, installing a GPS tracking device on a vehicle did not 
constitute a search because people cannot have an “objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in what is regularly exposed to 
public view.”178
But even a parolee’s reduced expectation of privacy does not 
necessarily allow for unrestrained use of GPS tracking technology.  In 
State v. Chism,179 the trial court modified Chism’s home detention 
conditions to include non-stop GPS surveillance.180  Subsequently, the 
appellate court invalidated this order because it went beyond the 
 172 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. 
 173 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 174 Id. at 1126 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986)); see also 
United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a 
suspect “ha[s] no expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a public 
roadway” and thus the use of a GPS device to track vehicles does not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 175 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (2001). 
 176 Id. at 736. 
 177 Id. at 740 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that a probation search can 
be “justified by a reasonable suspicion that the probationer was engaged in criminal 
activity”). 
 178 Id. at 740, 742. 
 179 813 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 180 Id. at 408. 
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court’s statutorily created authority to require a record of when an 
offender in a home detention program was and was not actually 
present in his home.181  The court added that when a home detainee 
qualifies as a violent offender, subjected to “constant supervision . . . 
using . . . surveillance equipment,” GPS tracking may be 
permissible—but this condition did not apply to Chism, a regular 
(not violent) offender.182  The case then advanced to the Indiana 
Supreme Court, which rejected the appellate court’s decision and 
held instead that broadcast devices are acceptable tools for 
monitoring all parolees.183  As a result, this tortured case, in its 
entirety, embodies the legal system’s struggle to find appropriate uses 
for GPS technology and reasonable limits on its invasive capabilities—
even when the subjects of monitoring are convicted criminals. 
While by no means settled,184 the law regarding the use of GPS 
devices in the criminal context offers some interesting comparisons 
with the law regarding use of this technology to observe employees.  
In all instances, the acceptable use of GPS hinges on a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and both Fourth Amendment law and tort law 
have found such an expectation unreasonable when activity takes 
place in the “public eye.”185  But the Jackson decision suggests that this 
assumption should be reconsidered in light of the extremely invasive 
nature of GPS monitoring systems.  Additionally, Indiana courts have 
made arguments for and against the rights of convicted felons to 
statutorily created protections against overly invasive uses of GPS 
tracking technology.  At a minimum, law abiding employees certainly 
deserve the same protections as criminal suspects and convicts.186  If 
 181 Id. at 409–10. 
 182 Id. at 410–11. 
 183 Chism v. State, 824 N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ind. 2005), vacating Chism, 813 N.E.2d 
402. 
 184 See United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004) (pondering 
whether the U.S. Supreme Court will extend Knotts and Karo’s beeper analysis to GPS 
devices but declining to “decide whether modern GPS devices effect a search and 
seizure”). 
 185 See supra notes 134, 174 (addressing the “public eye” argument against tort and 
Fourth Amendment claims, respectively). 
 186 At least in the case of parolees, one can argue that GPS tracking makes sense.  
These devices enable more efficient and cost-effective supervision of people who 
were convicted of crimes and, for the term of their punishment, forfeited some of 
the expectations of privacy they would have enjoyed otherwise.  GPS might also more 
effectively deter recidivism, as data recorded with a GPS device can be “cross-
tabulated . . . with crime incident data being reported by participating law 
enforcement agencies” and “crime-mapping software can be used to pinpoint 
whether monitored offenders were in the vicinity of a reported crime close to the 
time it was committed.”  Cecil E. Greek, Tracking Probationers in Space and Time: The 
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society’s significant interest in deterring recidivism cannot justify 
boundless location-based surveillance, it seems incongruous to grant 
employers a monitoring power greater than that of law enforcement.  
The interest asserted by the employer could not possibly be more 
substantial.187
B. Use of GPS by Businesses to Monitor Consumers 
At least in one area, lawmakers have quickly responded to the 
abusive intrusions made possible by GPS tracking devices.  Rental car 
companies created quite a stir when customers discovered that their 
service providers had monitored their driving patterns for the express 
purpose of assessing fines for misuse.  Caught off guard and unaware, 
customers racked up hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of dollars 
in penalty charges.  For example: 
In one case, a family picked up a car at a Payless Car Rental in San 
Francisco and began a 12-day road trip through several Western 
States.  When [they] returned the vehicle, they received a $3,405 
bill for violating the rental contract which prohibited them from 
leaving California: $1/mile for every mile driven out-of-state.  
Convergence of GIS and GPS Systems, FED. PROBATION, June 2002, at 51.  The criminal 
justice system could better control the threat posed by convicts released early from 
overcrowded prisons by using GPS tracking technology to more effectively 
apprehend members of an at-risk, and perhaps not yet fully rehabilitated, 
population.  Unlike employers, law enforcement officers have a substantial interest in 
using GPS tracking devices around the clock because public safety might be 
enhanced. 
 187 It is true that criminal suspects and parolees might have Fourth Amendment 
protections that do not apply in the world of private employment.  See supra notes 69, 
156.  The law has traditionally been suspicious of government power, as evidenced by 
the limits the founders placed on state sponsored invasions of personal space.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  In contrast, the law has favored a market-based approach for 
curbing employer abuses of power.  Finkin, supra note 105, at 10; supra text 
accompanying note 105; see also Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 182 
(Conn. 2000) (expressing discomfort with interfering in the employer-employee 
relationship).  Contra Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, On Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1994) (lamenting the departure from a market-based approach 
to employment regulation embodied in anti-discrimination and other employment 
laws).  However, both the constitutional and tort doctrines protecting privacy are 
subject to a reasonableness requirement, and allowing private employers, who can be 
held accountable for tortious invasions, to treat employees worse than paroled 
convicts certainly seems unreasonable.  Moreover, in the context of location based 
services, the threat posed by a Big Brother government, as opposed to a Big Brother 
employer, may have been more ominous when only the government had access to 
GPS.  But now that the system has been opened to civilian use, employers’ actions 
can be just as invasive as the government’s.  See supra notes 29, 30, 36, 38 and 
accompanying text; see also Lever, supra note 14, at 219 (discussing the end of 
government’s selective availability program, which once allowed only limited use of 
the satellite system by civilian operations). 
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When the family complained, arguing that they didn’t know they 
were prohibited from driving out-of-state, the company presented 
them with a map showing their exact route outside of California 
as detailed by a tracking device in the car.  In addition, the 
company argued that the family should have known about the 
[system used to track them] because their contract stated that the 
car “might be equipped with a tracking device.” . . . [But this 
information was] in fine print in an addendum to the contract 
and was never mentioned by the rental agent to the family.188
Similarly, American Car Rental surprised James Turner when it 
withdrew $450 from his account to cover three instances of speeding 
recorded by a GPS tracking device.189  One commentator noted that 
the company imposed these penalties “even though [Turner] had 
received no tickets from Connecticut state troopers, and had not 
been able to contest the allegations in court.”190
Motivated by this great injustice, one state quickly enacted 
consumer protection legislation in response.  On August 25, 2004, 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California signed into law an 
amendment to the Civil Code regulations of vehicle rental 
agreements.  The law “prohibits a rental company that uses electronic 
surveillance technology in its rental vehicles from using, accessing, or 
obtaining information relating to the renter’s use of the rental 
vehicle that was obtained using that technology.”191  In the California 
 188 CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REG. SESS., BILL ANALYSIS OF A.B. 
2840 (Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter A.B. 2840 BILL ANALYSIS]. 
 189 Turner v. Am. Car Rental, No. CV010456353S, 2004 WL 1888947 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. July 21, 2004); see also A.B. 2840 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 188.  Like the 
Payless family, Mr. Turner was “warned” about this practice in the fine print of his 
contract.  Turner, 2004 WL 1888947, at *2 (“The lease stated there was a global 
positioning system (GPS) in the vehicle, and it also stated that if the plaintiff 
exceeded the posted speed limit he would be charged $150.00 for each such 
occurrence.”). 
 190 White, supra note 40, at 5.  Mr. Turner eventually prevailed, however, when a 
jury returned a verdict in favor of his invasion of privacy claim.  Turner, 2004 WL 
1888947, at *1.  The court ordered a refund of the $450 fine as well as attorney’s 
fees.  Id. at *2; see also Am. Car Rental v. Comm’r of Consumer Prot., 869 A.2d 1198, 
1201 (Conn. 2005) (holding that speeding fees unrelated to the actual damage done 
to the car, which depends on the duration of excessive speed and not the number of 
times a renter exceeded the speed limit, “constitute[s] an illegal penalty and . . . an 
unfair trade practice offensive to public policy”). 
 191 Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, New Laws for California 
Consumers (Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.dca.ca.gov/press_releases/2004/ 
1231.htm; see also Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 2840 (Cal. 2004).  In relevant 
part, the law states: “A rental company may not use, access, or obtain any information 
relating to the renter’s use of the rental vehicle that was obtained using electronic 
surveillance technology, except in the following circumstances . . . .”  CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1936(o) (West Supp. 2005). 
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consumer bill, notice to the customer is not enough—the state 
imposed a blanket ban on any use of GPS devices for surveillance of 
rental car customers. 
Like employers, rental car companies also have legitimate 
business reasons for monitoring renters after they leave the lot.  
Indeed, Payless only sought “to make sure business travelers and 
other customers adhere[d] to in-state travel agreements . . . .”192  Of 
equal, if not more, importance to the rental agency is an ability to 
recover lost or stolen vehicles.  Additionally, because GPS systems can 
also provide information about miles traveled, these devices offer a 
convenient way to keep track of information used to maintain the 
fleet.  The California law, however, recognizes some of these 
concerns and provides important exceptions that take these interests 
into account.  Electronic surveillance technology can be used to 
recover vehicles and provide timely maintenance.193  But, “[a] rental 
company may not use electronic surveillance technology to track a 
renter in order to impose fines or surcharges relating to the renter’s 
use of the rental vehicle.”194  As Part V will describe, similar provisions 
in a law protecting employees from discipline for information 
discovered through invasive monitoring could recognize an 
employer’s legitimate interest in fleet and personnel management, 
while still providing employees with reasonable privacy protections.  
A “balancing of interests solution,” similar to the one governing the 
business-customer relationship, makes more sense in the context of 
employment—as opposed to the “one-sided, absolute power” model 
 192 See, e.g., Darcy, supra note 65. 
 193 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1936(o)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), (o)(6) (West Supp. 2005). 
 194 Id. § 1936(p).  California’s response to notorious instances of customer 
surveillance has not yet been duplicated in the federal arena or elsewhere.  In 2001, 
Senator John Edwards proposed the “Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001.”   
S. 1164, 107th Cong. (2001).  A piece of consumer protection legislation, the bill 
hoped “[t]o provide for the enhanced protection of the privacy of location 
information of users of location-based services and applications . . . .”  Id.  If passed, 
the bill would have required the FCC to promulgate rules governing location-based 
service providers’ responsibility to provide detailed notice of their customer 
information collection practices.  Id.  Additionally, service providers would have 
needed customer authorization to collect, use, or retain customer data.  Id.  The bill 
did not, however, progress beyond its assignment to the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation.  This may have been a result of unfortunate timing—
“[i]n the wake of the tragedy of September 11, the attitude toward the propriety of 
widespread surveillance . . . markedly changed.”  Mark G. Young, What Big Eyes and 
Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1017, 1018 (2002).  Recent rumblings in the state legislatures suggest that we are 
again ready to have a discussion about sensible limits on surveillance.  See discussion 
supra Part III.B.2 and infra Part V.B. 
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that appears to control the law enforcement-criminal suspect 
relationship. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REASONABLE PROTECTION AGAINST GPS 
MONITORING OF EMPLOYEES 
As explained in Part II, GPS tracking devices offer businesses in 
a range of industries an unprecedented ability to control remote 
operations.  But this technology also creates unparalleled 
opportunities to invade an employee’s personal life.  As use of “the 
type of technology used in the criminal justice system to track 
prisoners”195 becomes commonplace, we will lose our ability to object 
to these invasions, because accepted practices will redefine our 
“reasonable expectations.”196  Indeed, in the employment context, we 
have already seen privacy erode as the law has refused to protect 
many employee communications and after-hours activities.197  
Although this Article does not challenge these well-established 
doctrines regarding off-duty privacy in general, it does call for a 
different rule when GPS technology is involved.  As the Jackson 
opinion suggested, GPS tracking systems simply put more 
information than necessary in the hands of those who can use it 
unjustly.198
A. Federal Laws that have Failed 
Admittedly, if past efforts are any indicator of future success, 
then establishing a privacy right for employees, even one limited to 
after-hours, off-site surveillance, will be difficult to achieve.  Recent 
legislative proposals for federal protection have not fared well.  
 195 Michael R. Triplett, Employee Tracking Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and 
Potential Employee Backlash, 72 U.S.L.W. 2664, May 4, 2004 (quoting Cindy-Ann L. 
Thomas, attorney). 
 196 See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
 197 See supra notes 4–5, 92–101 and accompanying text; see also infra note 282. 
 198 See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text; see also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 
217 (Wash. 2003).  Relevant to this discussion, the court in Jackson observed that: 
[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device is 
quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal 
about an individual’s life.  For example, the device can provide a 
detailed record of travel to doctors’ offices, banks, gambling casinos, 
tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery 
stores, exercise gyms, places where children are dropped off for school, 
play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant and the fast food 
restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball game, the “wrong” 
side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor rally. 
Id. at 262. 
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However, these failures provide guidance for drafting a more 
successful policy. 
1. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act (PCWA) 
In 1993, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act (“PCWA”) 
debuted in both the Senate and the House.199  “[D]esigned to prevent 
abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace,”200 these nearly 
identical bills sought to prohibit “the collection, storage, analysis, or 
reporting of information concerning an employee’s activities by 
means of . . . electronic observation and supervision . . . which is 
conducted by any method other than direct observation by another 
person . . . .”201  The means designed to accomplish this end were 
somewhat unique, as the bills proposed a tiered system that tied 
acceptable monitoring practices to the tenure of a particular 
employee.  Recognizing the employer’s interest in conducting a 
highly scrutinized trial period of initial employment, the bills allowed 
random monitoring during an employee’s first sixty days.202  Periodic 
surveillance of entire work groups was also permissible for limited 
periods of time.203  However, an employer could not randomly 
monitor employees with five or more years of tenure, regardless of 
their position.204  Employees could petition for legal or equitable 
 199 S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993) (introduced by Sen. Paul Simon); H.R. 1900, 103d 
Cong. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Pat Williams).  Both bills would have applied to 
“any individual, corporation, partnership, labor organization, unincorporated 
association, or any other legal business, the Federal Government, and any State (or 
political subdivision thereof).”  S. 984 § 2(4)(B); H.R. 1900 § 2(3)(B). 
 200 H.R. REP. NO. 103-872, at 45 (1994). 
 201 S. 984 § 2(2)(A); H.R. 1900 § 2(1)(A).  The PCWA also attempted to plug the 
holes in workplace privacy protection that resulted from the adoption of the Internet 
as a new workplace tool.  At the time, some experts believed that the ECPA’s limits 
on intercepting electronic communications, see discussion supra notes 144–48, would 
not effectively stop employers from monitoring employees’ e-mails because 
employers could rely on the exception for messages intercepted “in the ordinary 
course of business.”  Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act: Hearing on H.R. 1900 Before 
the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 103d 
Cong. (1993) (testimony of Lewis L. Maltby, American Civil Liberties Union), 
available at http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/em_testimony_6-30-93.html.  
Surprisingly though, the real impediment to extending ECPA’s protections to 
employees’ e-mail communications arose from the employers’ ability to store e-mail 
messages.  According to some courts, employers who read electronically stored 
messages have not “intercepted” anything under the ECPA.  Nathan Watson, Note, 
The Private Workplace and the Proposed “Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice” 
Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79, 82–88 (2001).  The PCWA proposed to remedy this 
oversight. 
 202 S. 984 § 5(b)(1); H.R. 1900 § 5(b)(1). 
 203 S. 984 § 5(b)(2); H.R. 1900 § 5(b)(2). 
 204 S. 984 § 5(b)(3); H.R. 1900 § 5(b)(3). 
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relief from the employer, who also faced potential civil penalties of 
“not more than $10,000 for each . . . violation.”205
The proposed act also included detailed specifications for the 
format of the notice employers needed to give to “each employee 
who [would] be electronically monitored.”  Employers would have 
been required to provide prior written notice detailing: (1) “[t]he 
forms of electronic monitoring to be used,” (2) “[t]he personal data 
to be collected,” (3) “[t]he hours and days per calendar week that 
electronic monitoring will occur,” (4) “[t]he use to be made of 
personal data collected,” and (5) how the electronic monitoring will 
be conducted and its results evaluated.206  The bill waived the notice 
requirement if the employer had a reasonable suspicion that the 
employee was violating criminal or civil law or acting adversely to the 
employer’s interests.207
Relevant to prohibiting surveillance of an employee’s after-hours 
activities, the PCWA also proposed an absolute ban on the intentional 
collection of personal data about an employee, unrelated to the 
employee’s work—unless the employee was a customer at the time of 
the surveillance.208  Given this provision and others discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs, had the PCWA passed, this Article might have 
been unnecessary.  Assuming that the definition of “the employee’s 
work” was not intended to include the indirect effects that not 
sleeping enough or eating poorly after hours might have on an 
employee’s performance, the PCWA may have protected employees 
from an employer’s intrusive look into their personal lives.209
However, the PCWA was not meant to be, as “the bill died . . . a 
‘mysterious death’ in committee.”210  Some speculate that the bill’s 
defeat stemmed from “the lobbying power behind retail, security, and 
restaurant interests” who pitched “electronic surveillance as a loss-
prevention measure.”211  Others suggest that the rigid notice 
 205 H.R. 1900 § 12(a)(1), (c)(1); see also S. 984 § 12(a)(1), (c)(1). 
 206 S. 984 § 4(b); H.R. 1900 § 4(b) . 
 207 S. 984 § 5(c)(1); H.R. 1900 § 5(c)(1). 
 208 S. 984 § 10(a); H.R. 1900 § 10(a). 
 209 Some commentators would disagree.  Professor Wilborn asserts: “Even if it had 
passed, however, the PCWA would not [have been] sufficient.  By focusing almost 
exclusively on providing employees with notice of employer monitoring, the 
proposed PCWA fail[ed] to delineate what types of monitoring [would] be 
inappropriate even with adequate notice.”  Wilborn, supra note 24, at 851. 
 210 Corbett, supra note 10, at 115. 
 211 Karen A. Springer, In God We Trust; All Others Who Enter this Store Are Subject to 
Surveillance, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 187, 192 (1995) (citing newspaper accounts of 
criticisms from retail and security lobbyists); see also Jennifer J. Laabs, Surveillances: 
Tool or Trap?, PERSONNEL J., June 1992, at 96 (describing the various objections that 
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requirements failed to account for different business needs for 
monitoring, something not shared across all industries, and that this 
weakness caused the bill to fail on its own merits.212  Drafters of 
federal limitations on after-hours monitoring of employees should 
seriously consider these potential obstacles to the PCWA’s passage. 
2. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act (NEMA) 
The similarly ill-fated Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act 
(“NEMA”) followed the PCWA in 2000.213  “[M]ore . . . focused” and 
“less ambitious” than its predecessor,214 NEMA proposed 
amendments to Title II of ECPA that would have placed a simple 
notice requirement on electronic monitoring of employee 
communication in the workplace.215  Compliance with the act 
required annual dissemination of information on the form of 
communication or computer usage to be monitored, the means for 
and frequency of monitoring, and the information sought and how it 
would be used.216  Although “lean and mean” compared to its 
“bloated forefather,” the PCWA,217 NEMA also proposed significant 
penalties for employers, including damages recoverable by an 
individual employee that ranged from $5,000 to $20,000.218
industry, labor, and the U.S. Department of Labor had to an earlier version of the 
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218). 
 212 Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-Mail!  Employee E-Mail Monitoring and Privacy 
Law in the Age of the “Electronic Sweatshop”, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 171 (1994) 
(providing an example of how the law failed to account for various business needs 
and explaining that “monitoring of all employees for more than two hours per week 
may be justifiable and even necessary for polling and survey research organizations 
and telemarketing firms”). 
 213 H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 214 Charles R. Frayer, Comment, Employee Privacy and Internet Monitoring: Balancing 
Workers’ Rights and Dignity with Legitimate Management Interests, 57 BUS. LAW. 857, 869 
n.86 (2002). 
 215 Although the act included subtitles describing sections like “Electronic 
monitoring in the workplace,” the act only covered an “employer who intentionally, 
by any electronic means, reads, listens to, or otherwise monitors any wire 
communication, oral communication, or electronic communication of an employee 
of the employer, or otherwise monitors the computer usage of an employee of the 
employer . . . .”  H.R. 4908 § 2(a)(1)(B) (proposing new language for 18 U.S.C. § 
2711).  Because the radio signals used to pinpoint the location of a GPS tracking 
device are likely beyond the definition of “electronic communication of an 
employee” intended by the act, the bill did not address every instance of 
“[e]lectronic monitoring in the workplace.”  Id. 
 216 Id. (proposing new language for 18 U.S.C. § 2711(b)(1)–(4)). 
 217 Frayer, supra note 214, at 869. 
 218 H.R. 4908 § 2(a)(1)(B) (proposing new language for 18 U.S.C. § 2711(d)).  
Congress proposed an overall damages cap of $500,000 for a given violation.  Id. 
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Unlike PCWA, NEMA did not offer substantive employee rights 
or restrict employers’ abilities to monitor.219  These shortcomings led 
some to classify the statute as mere “dignity legislation”—not a 
privacy law.220  Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, even accused the law of being 
counterproductive for employees, whose reasonable expectation of 
privacy would be undermined by an employer’s provision of notice.221  
Others, however, hailed NEMA as “part of the answer to one of the 
major concerns of the American public today—the loss of privacy in 
the face of new technology.”222  James Dempsey of the Center for 
Democracy and Technology noted that changes in privacy law were 
long overdue223 and predicted that the law would make significant 
contributions to the restoration of worker privacy.224  But eventually, 
the critics carried the day.  In mid-September of 2000, Congress 
tabled NEMA because of “concerns [expressed] ‘by various business 
and employer coalitions’” regarding “the potential for an ‘increase in 
employment litigation . . . .’”225
 219 Watson, supra note 201, at 92–93 (“NEMA’s language does not prohibit 
monitoring, but merely requires an employer to give notice before electronic 
monitoring occurs.”). 
 220 Frayer, supra note 214, at 869. 
 221 Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Marc 
Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), 2000 WL 
1268416 (warning that “an employee’s claims under state common law tort theories 
could be undermined because employees would be effectively on notice of the 
monitoring practices”).  However, as previously noted, even without NEMA and 
without notice, most employees have trouble establishing a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when using an employer’s property or when exposed to the public eye.  See 
discussion supra Part III.B.1.b. 
 222 Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of James 
X. Dempsey, Center for Democracy and Technology) [hereinafter Dempsey 
Testimony], 2000 WL 1257244. 
 223 Id. (“It is sufficient to note that privacy laws underwent their last major update 
in 1986 with the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act—well 
before email, cellular phones, and the World Wide Web became the fixtures of 
business and personal lives that they are today.”). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Frayer, supra note 214, at 871 (citations omitted); see also Notice of Electronic 
Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Michael Robert Overly), 
2000 WL 1268419 (complaining that NEMA’s notice requirements were “unduly 
onerous and [would] almost certainly lead to litigation as to whether or not a notice 
included sufficient detail”).  Overly called for some form of a verification 
requirement, which would demonstrate that an employee had read and understood 
the notice and prevent at least some of the predicted unnecessary litigation.  Id. 
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Congress’ failure to pass the PCWA and NEMA does not bode 
well for future efforts to reform worker privacy law through federal 
legislation.  Employers opposed to new restrictions can more easily 
target and lobby federal lawmakers, as opposed to the various state 
legislatures around the country.226  However, a federal law is a 
superior option to the patchwork of privacy protection that will 
develop if state legislatures are stuck with the task of protecting 
employees from intrusive location-based monitoring.  Several states 
are already at work on such laws.227  This situation should alarm 
employers, who will “run[] the risk of facing different laws in various 
jurisdictions and uncertainty regarding which state law may govern 
particular [situations].”228
B. Current State Proposals 
Although state efforts to enact some form of workplace privacy 
law have not fared much better than their federal counterparts,229 this 
has not discouraged state lawmakers from trying.230  In their 2003–04 
sessions, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Virginia, among others,231 debated some form of an employee 
monitoring bill.  The California law would have required an 
employer to give notice of its intent to collect information on 
employee activities.  GPS-enabled devices were not specifically 
 226 But see Wilborn, supra note 24, at 862 (“Attempted legislative action on the 
state level has been repeatedly blocked by company threats to move their business to 
a state without the proposed restrictions.”). 
 227 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 228 Wilborn, supra note 24, at 862. 
 229 See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 10, at 116 (“In 2001, for the third consecutive year, 
the California legislature passed an electronic monitoring notice bill, and for the 
third time in three years [then-]Democratic Governor Gray Davis vetoed the bill 
[because, in his opinion, it] ‘place[d] unnecessary and complicating obligations on 
employers.’”). 
 230 And in some instances, succeeding.  Connecticut enacted an employee 
electronic monitoring bill (requiring notice only) in 1998.  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31–
48(d) (West 2003).  The law, however, only addresses “collection of information on 
an employer’s premises” and therefore does not encompass the problem of after-hours 
monitoring taken up in this article.  Id. § 31-48d(3) (emphasis added). 
 231 According to Lewis Maltby, president of the National Workrights Institute, New 
Jersey, Illinois, Minnesota, and Alaska also considered electronic monitoring notice 
bills during this period.  Darcy, supra note 65.  Some of these bills primarily focused 
on e-mail monitoring, although the Institute felt the laws might be broad enough to 
encompass GPS.  Id.  In addition, Maryland recently entertained a general electronic 
monitoring notice bill.  H.B. 686, 419th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005).  
However, a discussion of every bill recently debated is not necessary.  The statutes 
selected for discussion in the text are sufficiently illustrative of the laws being 
proposed, at the state level, to curb GPS tracking of employees. 
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mentioned; however, the act broadly applied to the use of “electronic 
devices.”  The law was strictly a notice statute—employers would have 
simply been required to provide a warning that specified the 
activities, including those not related to the employer’s business, that 
would be monitored and a description of the information sought 
through this process.232  But after passing both houses, the bill was 
vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger.233
Michigan and Pennsylvania’s draft legislation, like NEMA, 
specifically targeted monitoring of electronic communications and 
contemplated requiring companies to follow detailed notice 
provisions before initiating a monitoring program.234  Virginia’s 
proposal also relied on the provision of notice.235  Of particular 
interest was the Massachusetts act, which specifically addressed after-
hours surveillance and mirrored many of the provisions in the 
defunct PCWA.  The act broadly defined “electronic monitoring” to 
include any means of collecting information on employee activities 
other than direct observation.236  Additionally, the act barred 
collection of information off-site or unrelated to the employee’s 
work.237  This bill probably asked too much of employers, because it 
would have prevented them from keeping tabs on their vehicles and 
mobile workers during business hours.  Employers will not stand for 
this.  But employers need not worry just yet—all of these ideas have 
yet to make it out of committee.  Still, they represent tangible 
evidence of support for employee privacy protections that federal 
laws have failed to provide. 
C. Proposal for a New Federal Law 
The productivity, efficiency, and quality control arguments that 
tipped the scales in favor of employers in other challenges to 
 232 S.B. 1841, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). 
 233 California Bill Tracking, S.B. 1841, Reg. Sess., STATENET, Sept. 29, 2004, 
http://www.lexis.com (search citation “2003 Bill Tracking CA S.B. 1841”).  Note that 
this was the same governor who signed into law consumer protections against GPS 
tracking just one month before.  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 234 S.B. 893, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); S.B. 675, 92d Legis., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003). 
 235 H.B. 1887, 2003 Sess. (Va. 2003). 
 236 S.B. 2190, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (Mass. 2003).  Senator Marc 
Pacheco recently reintroduced a nearly identical bill.  S.B. 1117, 184th Gen. Court, 
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005). 
 237 S.B. 2190, 183d Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Mass. 2003) (“An employer may 
use electronic surveillance to collect any information so long as: (i) the information 
is collected at the employer’s premises and (ii) the information is confined to the 
employee’s work.”). 
YUNG FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  11:28:21 AM 
2005] GPS MONITORING OF EMPLOYEES 211 
 
employee surveillance practices simply do not apply when an 
employer seeks to use location tracking systems to unearth 
information about an employee’s private life.  This activity goes well 
beyond the dangers that Congress considered when weighing the 
merits of both the PCWA and NEMA.  When an employee “sells” her 
services to an employer, she does not offer as part of the package an 
option for the employer to engage in espionage.238  Because common 
law doctrines and existing laws provide inadequate safeguards in this 
area, a new federal law is required.239
A federal law will simply better serve both employers’ and 
employees’ interests, as both groups operate in an increasingly 
borderless environment.  Because state laws “[differ] across 
jurisdictions in their nature and enforcement, [they] lack the 
uniformity of federal law.  Additionally, state law is ill-suited for 
regulating a technology which erases state and national borders.”240  
From the employer side, “a federal statute would make compliance 
more efficient,”241 while from the employee side, such a law would 
provide a mobile workforce with a clear understanding of their rights, 
regardless of location.  (This assumes, of course, that ardent lobbyists 
will successfully arrange for a drafting that preempts state innovations 
in this area of the law.)242
Specific provisions of the law that will be both effective and 
politically palatable are, however, more difficult to define than the 
law’s scope.  As experience has shown, even modest privacy proposals 
like the PCWA and NEMA made powerful enemies in both camps.243  
 238 Isajiw, supra note 16, at 94 (“[W]hile a person subordinates herself to her 
employer while at work, this subordination extends only to the performance of work-
related activities.  The employee sells her services to the employer and nothing 
more.”); see also NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., supra note 47, at 19 (“This sort of tracking 
seems reminiscent of someone who is in servitude, rather than someone who is being 
paid for his work.”). 
 239 See discussion supra Part III.B; see also Corbett, supra note 10, at 103 (noting 
that “electronic monitoring is an area where technology has outstripped the law, 
leaving employees largely unprotected”). 
 240 Kesan, supra note 4, at 301. 
 241 Wilborn, supra note 24, at 879. 
 242 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000) (Copyright Act preemption provision) 
(“[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 . . . are governed 
exclusively by this title”), with H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1993) (proposed 
PCWA) (“This Act shall not be construed to restrict, limit, or eliminate a 
requirement of a State or political subdivision of a State or a collective bargaining 
agreement relating to electronic monitoring which is more stringent than any 
requirement of this Act.”).  See also infra note 260. 
 243 Corbett, supra note 10, at 137 (“The PCWA and NEMA would have imposed 
modest regulations on electronic monitoring of employees, but they were bottled up 
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But, if used to prohibit GPS surveillance under limited circumstances, 
specifically when the employee is off the clock, many of the same 
provisions that failed as part of the PCWA and NEMA may still find 
their way into the federal code.  The following describes how such a 
law might look. 
1. Notice Requirement 
First and foremost, employers need to let employees know that 
they are under watch.  In terms of content, the notice should specify 
what location-based tracking devices are installed, where they are 
installed, and what they are capable of observing.  Additionally, as the 
PCWA experience demonstrates, the notice requirement should not 
include both a detailed (seven part) individual notice before every 
instance of monitoring as well as an all-inclusive general 
announcement that the employer plans to monitor.244  A simple one-
time provision of notice, with acknowledgment of the notice signed 
by the employee, should suffice.  This practice will not only serve to 
inform the employee, but it also will provide the employer with some 
protection in the event that the employee tries to claim he did not 
know about the policy.245  Moreover, it will take the “guesswork” out 
of “[h]ow often, or on what system” an employer monitors its 
employees.246
2. Technology Requirement 
The employer should also either be required to provide 
employees with a technical and real247 power to turn off the devices in 
order to cloak their off-duty activities, or at least guarantee that any 
off-duty observations will not be used in employment decisions.248  
Particularly when devices are not embedded in equipment of 
substantial value, the law should favor a system capable of being 
in congressional committees by business groups.”); see also supra notes 210–12, 220–
25 and accompanying text. 
 244 See H.R. 1900 § 4(a)–(b). 
 245 As noted, the provision of notice is a double-edged sword for the employee 
because it deprives him of any claim to a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”  See 
supra note 221.  However, because employees are unlikely to succeed on tort claims 
that involve a showing of the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, supra 
Part III.B.1.b, this objection is moot. 
 246 ORWELL, supra note 1, at 4. 
 247 Cf. supra note 49. 
 248 See discussion infra Parts V.C.2, V.C.3. 
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turned off—a feature that at least some systems currently offer.249  
This will minimize the possibility that employers will use the devices 
to determine an employee’s extracurricular interests.  Workers, like 
the snowplow operators in Massachusetts,250 will likely chafe if 
employers use a record of when the GPS device was on and off to 
verify hours worked for payroll purposes.  However, employee privacy 
protection legislation requires a critical balancing of interests as new 
technologies emerge that offer legitimate benefits to employers at the 
expense of employees’ imagined right to privacy.251  Concessions 
need to come from both sides to make such laws work. 
3. Exceptions Limited to Legitimate Business Interest 
If an employer has a legitimate and significant business interest 
in monitoring an asset in the employee’s possession after hours, the 
new law should allow limited surveillance for the sole purpose of 
protecting the asset.252  Information about an employee’s legal, off-
duty activity, incidentally obtained as part of this exception to a 
general bar on after-hours monitoring, should not be used to 
discipline an employee.  The law should prohibit an employer from 
expanding the scope of permissible monitoring by fabricating some 
attenuated link between the activity observed and the employer’s 
amorphous interest in “reputation” or the like.253  Some reasonable 
limits must be placed on snooping.  This solution merely provides 
non-unionized employees with a sensible protection similar to ones 
 249 See Track Time with Comet Tracker, http://www.comettracker.com/time.html 
(“Workers log in to shifts and breaks using their phone. . . .  See which workers are 
logged in and ready for work.”). 
 250 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 251 See Isajiw, supra note 16, at 96. 
 252 Note that this exception would be designed to allow employers to track the 
after-hours whereabouts of big-ticket items such as the company car, but not cheap, 
easily replaceable cell phones or other low-cost equipment—items that an employee 
would likely agree to replace if lost in exchange for a little privacy. 
 253 See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business 
interests that have justified employers’ investigations of employees after hours.  An 
example of suitable language for a business-relatedness provision comes from H.B. 
2116, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003): “An employer may not [use] data 
[collected] on an employee through electronic monitoring which is not relevant to 
the employee’s performance.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Drafters of new legislation could 
easily broaden this language to include permission to use data collected to protect 
company property.  Alternatively, the law could borrow from the PCWA, which 
prohibited an employer from “tak[ing] any action against an employee on the basis 
of personal data obtained by electronic monitoring of such employee [while the 
employee was off-duty.]”  H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993) (emphasis added). 
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that forward-thinking unions have already secured for their 
members.254
4. Employee Access to Information 
Employers should also provide interested employees with access 
to the information collected on their whereabouts.  This provision 
would alleviate employee anxieties about a monitoring program and 
supply an inexpensive enforcement mechanism by empowering those 
with the greatest interest in making sure employers comply with the 
law with an ability to check for abuses.  Providing employees with a 
“reasonable opportunity to review all personal data obtained by 
electronic monitoring of the employee,”255 as other electronic 
monitoring laws have proposed, would recognize employees’ 
legitimate fears about how and what information might be used 
against them without placing onerous demands on employers, many 
of whom are already required under various laws to provide 
employees with access to their personnel files.256
5. Enforcement Provisions 
Finally, the enforcement provisions should be structured to 
minimize the burdens placed on employers who, in an unregulated 
world, could have enjoyed largely unfettered use of this technology.  
Like NEMA, a new law should provide both a floor for damages and a 
cap on the amount,257 thus making employers more certain of the 
liability they risk if found in violation of the law’s strictures.  Similarly, 
“significant but not onerous,”258 civil damages and the absence of 
criminal penalties would help overcome employers’ fears that this law 
 254 See, e.g., supra note 85. 
 255 H.R. 1900 § 7. 
 256 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5(a) (West 2003) (“Every employee has the 
right to inspect the personnel records that the employer maintains relating to the 
employee’s performance or to any grievance concerning the employee.”); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (2003) (“The employer shall, upon written request from an 
employee or former employee, provide the employee, former employee or duly 
authorized representative with an opportunity to review and copy the employee’s 
personnel file.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52C (West 2004) (“Any employer 
receiving a written request from an employee shall provide the employee with an 
opportunity to review his personnel record within five business days of such 
request.”).  In total, “eighteen states make provision for employees to have access to 
their personnel files.”  Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: 
The United States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 492 (2002). 
 257 Recall that “damages under NEMA . . . [had] both a floor of $5,000 and a two-
tier cap of $20,000 per employee and $500,000 per violation.”  Frayer, supra note 214, 
at 870; see also H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2(d)(2) (2000). 
 258 Dempsey Testimony, supra note 222. 
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will open them up to vast amounts of costly, needless litigation—a 
concern that has derailed past efforts to create employee privacy 
rights.259  A narrow range of reasonable damages may also facilitate 
settlement and will prevent employees from dreaming up outrageous 
values for “privacy rights” that they might not have otherwise.260  A 
conservative statute of limitations, a year or less, for example, could 
further limit the uncertainty regarding liability.261
Administration of the statute, depending on the assigned 
agency, could also impact how burdensome employers find new 
restrictions.  Given the nature of the law, the Department of Labor 
(“DOL”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) may be the most obvious choices for the job.  However, 
 259 See supra note 225.  Punitive damages, even if capped as they are under Title 
VII and the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000), should not be included as this would 
defeat the goal to provide employers with a known set of consequences for 
monitoring employees after hours. 
 260 Related to damages, the statute would have to address whether a court can 
award additional tort damages for violating a statutory duty.  In the context of 
employment law, “the workers’ compensation statute expressly excludes private tort 
remedies by employees against employers for workplace injury in most situations 
[while] statutes like Title VII, since the 1991 Civil Rights Act, expressly create tort 
liability.”  Drummonds, supra note 115, at 961.  Professor Drummonds’ article 
provides a cautionary tale of how courts can “create, or refuse to create, new torts out 
of statutory duties” when a statute remains silent on the tort remedy.  Id. at 995. 
 261 The statute of limitations for other employment laws is particularly brief.  For 
example, under Title VII, once the alleged unlawful employment action occurs, an 
employee has 180 days to file a charge.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).  If the 
aggrieved party files with a state-sponsored Fair Employment agency in lieu of the 
EEOC, the filing period is extended to between 240 and 300 days.  Id.; EEOC v. 
Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 112–13 (1980); Michael Selmi, The Value 
of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1, 7 & n.24 (1996) (noting that although the law states that the period for a 
state filing lasts 300 days, the state is assured a waivable 60-day investigation period 
that must conclude before the statute runs). 
One remaining area of uncertainty involves attorney’s fees and the costs of 
litigation.  Because the “significant but not onerous” amount at stake might be less 
than the cost of representation, forcing employees to bear the costs of litigation—win 
or lose—might discourage them from pursuing justice.  Thus, attorney’s fees and 
costs should at least be awarded to victorious plaintiffs.  However, to limit the flood 
of potential lawsuits to the most meritorious claims, and make the law more palatable 
for employers, the law might award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party, as opposed 
to only including them in the package created for a victorious plaintiff.  Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (allowing “the court, in its discretion, [to grant] the 
prevailing party, other than the [EEOC] or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s 
fee” in a Title VII case), with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (allowing “[t]he court . . . in 
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, [to grant] a 
reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant” in a Fair Labor Standards Act 
case), and 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2000) (incorporating into the ADEA, by reference, the 
remedies in 29 U.S.C. § 216). 
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because of the nature of the technology involved, the law may fit 
within the jurisdiction of the FCC.  Each agency could have a 
legitimate claim to regulate in this field. 
If responsibility lands with the DOL, then the agency role might 
be limited to rulemaking and optional investigatory activities, 
because, consistent with other DOL-administered statutes, plaintiffs 
could be allowed to file directly in court (similar to the procedures 
for filing the previously discussed tort actions and wrongful discharge 
claims262), without having to secure agency approval first.263  In 
contrast, the EEOC, responsible for administration of the nation’s 
anti-discrimination laws, consistently takes a more active role in 
lawsuits.  In addition to offering employers guidance on how to 
comply with discrimination laws,264 the EEOC screens cases and 
performs initial investigations in an attempt to assess the validity of a 
claim.265  When the EEOC determines that cause exists to believe that 
the employer has violated the law, it attempts to reconcile the 
employer’s and employee’s interests and proceeds to trial if common 
ground cannot be reached.266  If, however, the EEOC does not find 
cause, then the aggrieved employee receives a “right to sue” letter 
and has ninety days to pursue the case in federal court, without 
 262 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 263 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1), (3) (2000) (Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act); 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2000) (Family and Medical Leave Act).  In several 
instances though, statutes administered by the DOL are enforced through 
complaints filed with the department rather than plaintiff-initiated lawsuits.  See, e.g., 
38 U.S.C. § 4322 (2000) (Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act). 
 264 Although employers in practice give credence to EEOC guidelines, perhaps 
because “good faith reliance on EEOC interpretations is a defense to a Title VII 
action,” the EEOC does not have substantive rulemaking authority in all the areas it 
oversees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(1) (2000); John S. Moot, An Analysis of Judicial 
Deference to EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213, 214 n.8 (1987).  While 
Congress endowed the EEOC with such power to aid in enforcement of the ADA, see 
42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000), and the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000), it limited the 
EEOC’s authority under Title VII to procedural regulations, see Richard A. Bales, 
Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4–5 & n.33 (1999) 
(citing 110 CONG. REC. H2575 (statement of Rep. Celler)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (2000) (describing the EEOC’s role in enforcing Title VII, which does not include 
authority to issue regulations); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1–.93 (2004) (procedural regulations 
applicable to Title VII enforcement).  Legislators would need to consider which 
model to follow if they assigned enforcement responsibilities for the monitoring law 
proposed here to the EEOC. 
 265 Since 1999, the EEOC has also offered an alternative dispute resolution 
mediation option that “has been highly successful in resolving charges . . . .”  The 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, History of the EEOC Mediation 
Program, http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/history.html (Nov. 19, 2003). 
 266 Selmi, supra note 261, at 9. 
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prejudice.267  The process benefits employees who have free access to 
the materials collected through the EEOC’s investigatory process if 
and when a federal suit becomes necessary.  It also might appeal to 
employers, who would rather not litigate these matters if possible—
although the process can be intrusive and expensive for them, as they 
must comply with EEOC subpoenas and site-visit requests, as well as 
expend additional legal fees to defend themselves, first during the 
administrative process, and second, in federal court lawsuits. 
In creating the EEOC to manage discrimination complaints, 
“Congress recognized that the judicial system is not always the most 
efficient or best medium for resolving employment disputes,”268 and 
the same principle would seem to apply to the after-hours 
surveillance law proposed here.  Additionally, the EEOC, with its long 
history of separating legitimate business needs from pretexts for 
discrimination, might be in the best position to identify justifiable 
uses of monitoring technology.  However, the EEOC has been 
characterized as a cumbersome roadblock to the timely resolution of 
discrimination claims.269  Some have also argued that the EEOC 
administrative process is impotent, fails to keep employment disputes 
out of court, and only adds a wasteful layer of bureaucracy to the 
filing process.270  Adding another statute to its administrative load 
may only further stretch its already limited resources. 
Alternatively, the FCC already regulates consumer privacy in the 
telecommunications industry,271 and both the Automobile Association 
of America and the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet 
 267 Id.  For a more detailed discussion of the EEOC’s operating procedures, see 
Mary Kathryn Lynch, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Comments on the 
Agency and Its Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 20 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89 
(1990) and Selmi, supra note 261, at 1–12. 
 268 Anthony P. Zana, A Pragmatic Approach to EEOC Misconduct: Drawing a Line on 
Commission Bad Faith in Title VII Litigation, 73 MISS. L.J. 289, 320 (2003). 
 269 See generally Selmi, supra note 261. 
 270 See id. at 10 (“[T]hese procedures amount to a rather strange and vacuous 
process—one where thousands of claims are filed at no financial cost to the plaintiff, 
few are truly investigated, fewer still resolved, and none of which is binding on any of 
the parties.”).  Selmi also asserts that “[the EEOC’s] procedures lead to a large 
amount of litigation that would be unnecessary in many instances if claims were not 
initially processed by the agency.”  Id. at 11. 
 271 See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 42 U.S.C. § 222 
(2000) (placing restrictions on telecommunications carriers’ use or disclosure of 
customer proprietary network information (“CPNI”)).  But see U.S.W., Inc. v. FCC, 
182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (vacating FCC regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005, 
drafted in accordance with § 222, which required that telecommunications carriers 
secure affirmative customer permission to use CPNI, as opposed to requiring that 
customers opt out of an assumed approval to use CPNI; regulations violated First 
Amendment free speech protections). 
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Association have asked the FCC to regulate GPS tracking devices.  
Thus, the FCC may also assume responsibility.272  Unlike the DOL and 
the EEOC, the FCC has experience with implementing laws that limit 
how personal information can be collected and used against 
people.273  Therefore, the FCC might be in a better position to weigh 
the interests of both employers and employees in determining 
appropriate limits for the use of GPS surveillance systems in the 
context of employment. 
As this discussion illustrates, Congress will have to debate the 
merits of each agency’s claim to oversee administration of this law.  
Given the mix of technology and employment issues present in the 
proposed legislation, no one agency clearly trumps the others in its 
abilities to execute the statute’s provisions.  Additionally, how 
Congress reacts to GPS surveillance in other areas might also impact 
the suitability of a particular agency.  For example, if the FCC 
administers a statute dealing with customer privacy protections, an 
idea proposed in the Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001,274 then 
oversight in the employment context might be a natural extension of 
the agency’s responsibilities.  Then again, ultimately, this proposal 
deals with an employment issue, and the technology used to track 
employees today might not fall under the jurisdiction of the FCC of 
tomorrow.  The appropriate solution is unclear at the time of this 
Article’s publication. 
D. Responses to Criticisms of the Proposal 
Two aspects of this proposal will, admittedly, draw the ire of 
several commentators.  First, some employment law scholars believe 
that, in light of an imagined end to Congressional interest in 
employment law, demonstrated by the lack of any new provisions 
since 1993, future attempts to legislate in this arena will fail.  Second, 
 272 White, supra note 40, at 14; Petition of the Cellular Telecommunications 
Industry Ass’n for a Rulemaking to Establish Fair Location Information Practices, 
WT No. 01-72, (FCC Nov. 22, 2000), available at http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ 
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6512158796 (requesting that the 
FCC adopt location information privacy principles under its rulemaking authority 
provided by Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 222(f), (h)).  Additionally, White notes that the 
Location Privacy Protection Act of 2001, see supra note 194, also proposed the FCC as 
the appropriate administrative agency to regulate location-based services in the 
consumer context.  White, supra note 40, at 14; see also S. 1164, 107th Cong. § 2(6) 
(2001) (“It is in the public interest that the Federal Communications Commission 
establish comprehensive rules to protect the privacy of customers of location-based 
services applications . . . .”). 
 273 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.2005 (2005). 
 274 S. 1164, 107th Cong. § 2(6) (2001). 
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some scholars object to the continued piecemeal development of very 
specific worker protections.  However, neither critique should 
discourage the pursuit of the proposal presented here. 
Although failure and backlash from industry have characterized 
recent attempts to legislate on employment matters,275 the narrow 
scope of a statute providing after-hours protection against employee 
surveillance does not threaten employer interests in the same way 
that more general restrictions on all employee monitoring did.  
Employers objected to the “modest regulations” in the PCWA and 
NEMA because the provisions prohibited a broad range of 
monitoring activities that infringed on the employers’ ability to run 
legitimate training and quality assurance programs,276 and not 
because modern employers were stubbornly aligned in absolute 
opposition to any further regulation of the employer-employee 
relationship.277  During working hours, employers have a variety of 
business needs that electronic monitoring devices can serve most 
efficiently.  Indeed, even GPS devices, when used within the limits of 
employers’ business interests, have tremendous value as tools to 
improve efficiency in numerous areas.278  The after-hours protection 
called for in this Article simply does not tread on similar interests that 
employers will be willing to fight tooth and nail to defend. 
Likewise, complaints that a law focused only on covert, after-
hours surveillance will further fragment the already scattered body of 
employment law are without merit.  In reality, as the discussion in the 
preceding paragraph illustrates, broad worker privacy protections are 
not politically feasible.  Although, given the effort that will likely go 
into its passage, a comprehensive statute establishing workplace 
privacy rights would be ideal from the employees’ perspective, if past 
 275 Corbett, supra note 10, at 96 (warning that “despite the success of past 
employment legislation, resorting to this method of regulation too often can 
generate significant backlash”).  Corbett argues that “[r]egardless of whether an 
epoch in employment law history has passed, at this point in time, individual 
employment rights legislation is not an appropriate response to these emerging 
problems.”  Id. at 95.  Corbett calls instead for a “retrofit” of the common law to 
address a variety of workplace privacy invasions.  Id. at 152–61. 
 276 See Laabs, supra note 211; see also Julie A. Flannagan, Note, Restricting Electronic 
Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 43 DUKE L.J. 1256, 1278 (1994) (“[M]onitoring is 
an important tool to assist in proper training and to instill adherence to quality and 
safety guidelines.”). 
 277 Contra Corbett, supra note 10, at 134–35 (advising against worker privacy 
protections based on legislation because “employers do not like to be regulated, and 
they will oppose employment law, particularly legislation, which provides a concrete 
target when it is introduced in a legislature”). 
 278 See discussion supra Part II.C for examples of how GPS tracking systems can 
serve legitimate business interests. 
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experience is any indicator, employees may just have to settle for 
remedying the most egregious intrusions.  Additionally, while efforts 
should be made to define “electronic surveillance” as broadly as 
possible to accommodate new technology, we cannot realistically 
foresee every technological development that might be used to 
invade an employee’s after-hours solitude in the future.279  The 
immediate concern is to prevent after-hours tracking of employees 
using GPS devices.  If a more expansive definition of “electronic 
surveillance” will rouse employer opposition, then the proposal 
should stay focused on the problem at hand and remain open to 
amendment in the event of future technological changes.280
VI. CONCLUSION 
GPS surveillance tools pose a new, immediate threat to the 
personal autonomy of employees, the likes of which we have not seen 
before.281  As we explore the exciting new benefits this technology can 
offer, we must also embrace some limits on how employers use it to spy 
on employees.  Moreover, we cannot delay this endeavor, for 
“individuals internalize each incremental step of encroachment, and 
thereby lose any sense that privacy was once possible in the 
encroached upon area.”282  Protection must be provided before our 
 279 See Jill Yung, Comment, Virtual Spaces Formed by Literary Works: Should Copyright or 
Property Rights (or Neither) Protect the Functional Integrity and Display of a Website?, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 495, 507 n.66, 522, 536 (2004) (describing how, despite Congress’ best 
efforts to draft a copyright law capable of addressing future technological 
advancements, the law has struggled to encompass issues arising in a new forum for 
publication: the Internet).  But see Wilborn, supra note 24, at 852 (Wilborn warns that 
“[a]ny legislation which defines protection in terms of specific types of monitoring 
equipment will inevitably be rendered obsolete by newer employee-monitoring 
technology falling outside the scope of the legislation.  Device-specific privacy 
protection legislation enacted by Congress in the past has had only a limited effect in 
protecting the privacy rights of private-sector employees.”). 
 280 Some might argue that new legislation should offer sweeping protections in 
case employee rights advocates suffer another winless decade like the one 
experienced from 1993 until the present.  However, because recent, overly-ambitious 
proposals share some of the blame for their own failures, this Article proposes a fairly 
narrow solution to an alarming, immediate problem. 
 281 See LANE, supra note 8, at x (“Employer surveillance tools no longer necessarily 
discriminate between work-related and personal activities, and the steady expansion 
of workplace surveillance is threatening the privacy of our homes.”). 
 282 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 844 (2002).  In the context of employment, we have recently 
witnessed evidence of internalized encroachments.  J.D. Fay, vice president of 
corporate affairs for @Road Inc. (a provider of fleet monitoring and other location-
based services), reminds us that “‘[w]hen sales groups were [first] deployed with 
pagers [and later, cellphones], they were out in the field thinking . . . “My boss can 
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notion of a personal identity, separate from our identity as an 
employee, fades completely.283
Although some might object to yet another law addressing “a 
particular, narrowly defined invasion,”284 because more general 
protections against employee monitoring have failed to win approval, 
this Article advocates only for a solution to the most egregious form 
of employee surveillance: the after-hours location-based tracking of 
employees.  Such protection represents a realistic attempt to establish 
at least some employee privacy protections.  My proposal is a small 
step, but it is nonetheless a step in the right direction.  Moreover, it 
would establish the line beyond which employer surveillance clearly 
goes too far.  This would be a significant accomplishment in a field 
that has not seen much of a legislative response to the increasing 
threats to worker dignity and autonomy posed by technological 
advances.285  Additionally, this proposal recognizes that employers 
have significant and legitimate interests that GPS tracking 
technologies can serve.  Employees cannot realistically expect the law 
to completely disregard the lobbying power behind these interests, 
just as employers cannot expect employees to welcome Big Brother 
with open arms.  As is often the case in the law, balancing these 
interests is an essential part of finding an appropriate place for GPS 
surveillance technology in the private workplace. 
As an aside, even though the law currently poses few obstacles to 
the practice, employers should still carefully consider the decision to 
track a mobile workforce. Such activities could extend employer 
liability not otherwise imputable to the employer.  Recall that under 
call me at any time and he expects me to call him back!”  Now we wouldn’t dream of 
working without them’ . . . .”  Teicher, supra note 47 (alterations in original). 
 283 See LANE, supra note 8, at 241 (“The challenge that we face today is not so 
much how to protect privacy in the workplace . . . but how to protect the personal 
and household privacy of people who are also workers.”); see also 139 CONG. REC. 
S6123 (1993) (statement of Sen. Paul Simon in support of S. 984) (“Unless we begin 
now to define privacy—and in particular workplace privacy—as a value worth 
protecting, . . . new technologies will be upon us before we are ready for them.”). 
 284 Rod Dixon, With Nowhere to Hide: Workers Are Scrambling for Privacy in the Digital 
Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, ¶ 48 (Spring 1999), http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/ 
vol4/issue1/dixon.html (complaining that “[a] number of federal statutes regulate 
aspects of employee privacy, but each addresses only a particular, narrowly defined 
invasion.  For example, separate federal statutes regulate the use of polygraph 
testing, credit reports, and medical examinations by employers.  Similarly, over half 
of the states have statutes regulating the use of polygraphs in employment; at least 
fourteen limit employer drug testing plans; and nearly two dozen forbid adverse 
employment actions based on off-duty tobacco use.  No statute, however, deals with 
the issue of employee privacy in a comprehensive way.”). 
 285 Corbett, supra note 10, at 93. 
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the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can incur vicarious 
liability for the activities of its employees, and the scope of this 
responsibility depends, in part, on the employer’s ability to control 
the employee’s actions.286  “[T]he more information an employer has 
about its employees’ activities, then the greater the scope of 
‘foreseeable’ activity and less likely an employer will be able to argue 
that a particular employee was in fact [not acting within the scope of 
his employment].”287  In monitoring for the purpose of reducing 
liability, employers who interject themselves into the off-duty 
personal activities of employees may inadvertently create a link to 
these pursuits that spawns more employer liability.288  Furthermore, in 
addition to its effects on liability, employers should also consider the 
impact of GPS surveillance on worker morale—which studies show to 
be significant.289  While the laws do not regulate GPS monitoring 
practices just yet, social norms and the “creepiness factor” of anything 
likened to Big Brother should influence employers’ decisions on 
whether to use this technology in the meantime. 
 
 286 See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 287 LANE, supra note 8, at 187. 
 288 Use of GPS tracking technologies can backfire on employers in other ways as 
well.  For example, in an unreported decision from the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania, three judges upheld the Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review’s determination that the Township of Lower Frederick owed unemployment 
compensation benefits to a security officer who was dismissed when his manually 
recorded logs did not match a GPS report on his activities.  Twp. of Frederick v. 
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, No. 739 C.D. 2004 *1–2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 
16, 2004), http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/unpublished/739CD 
04_9-16-04.pdf.  The township’s draconian policy required officers to log “every stop 
of 10 minutes or longer” and when the claimant failed to report some of his longer 
investigatory stops, he was terminated.  Id. at 2.  The court held that negligent 
reporting of on-duty activities did not constitute the “willful misconduct” sufficient to 
justify denial of an unemployment benefits claim.  Id. at *7; see also McMaster v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., No. C04-4642MHP, 2005 WL 289982 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2005) 
(requesting a refund of a $3 per day “personal use” fee assessed for use of company 
vans because employees carried GPS-enabled phones and were arguably on the 
clock); NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., supra note 47, at 9 (cautioning that after-hours 
monitoring may have financial implications under federal wage and hour laws 
because “[u]nder some circumstances, employees who are on call are considered on 
duty for purposes of overtime calculation”). 
 289 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
